Separated Spaces - Shared Spaces in Jerusalem Today

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Resum

Aquest article tracta de la vida quotidiana i dels sistemes de planejament a Jerusalem, que han creat en l’actualitat situacions d’espais separats/compartits en una ciutat que ha estat declarada oficialment com políticament “unida”. L’article comença amb una breu revisió de la situació política, econòmica, social i cultural a la ciutat; segueix tot discutint el sistema de planificació a Israel i específicament a Jerusalem fent referència al control vers els residents palestins de Jerusalem. Aleshores, es presenta el cas d’Isawiye –un barri palestí a l’est de Jerusalem– per emfatitzar les relacions problemàtiques entre els residents palestins i les autoritats. L’article conclou amb algunes reflexions sobre el paper dels “polítics de la planificació” com configuradors de la vida quotidiana de la gent a la ciutat.

Paraules clau: Jerusalem, espais separats/compartits, planificació territorial, vida quotidiana

Resumen

Este artículo trata de la vida cotidiana y de los sistemas de planificación en Jerusalén, que han creado en la actualidad situaciones de espacios separados/compartidos en una ciudad que ha sido declarada oficialmente como políticamente “unida”. El artículo empieza con una breve revisión de la situación política, eco-
nómica, social y cultural en la ciudad; continúa discutiendo el sistema de planificación en Israel y específicamente en Jerusalén, haciendo referencia especial al control de los residentes palestinos en Jerusalén. Seguidamente se presenta el caso de Isawiyeh –un barrio palestino al este de Jerusalén– para enfatizar las relaciones problemáticas entre los residentes palestinos y las autoridades. El artículo concluye con algunas reflexiones sobre el papel de los “políticos de la planificación” como configuradores de la vida cotidiana de la gente en la ciudad.

**Palabras clave:** Jerusalén, espacios separados/compartidos, planificación territorial, vida cotidiana

**Abstract**

This paper introduces daily practices and planning systems in Jerusalem which actually create situations of separated/shared spaces in a city that has been officially declared as politically ‘united’. The paper begins with a brief background review of the current political, economic, social and cultural situation in the city, it then moves on to discuss the planning system in Israel and in the city highlighting its controlling nature especially towards the Palestinian residents of Jerusalem. Then, the case of Isawiyeh – a Palestinian village in East Jerusalem is presented to emphasize the problematic relationships between the Palestinian residents and the authorities. The paper concludes with some insights as to the role of the ‘politics of planning’ as shaping people’s everyday life in the city.

**Key words:** Jerusalem, separated/shared spaces, planning systems, everyday life

“I live in a building that was owned by the Palestinians. The building is full of holes from the bullets of the 1948 war it used to be the house of a Palestinian judge. In the War of Independence (1948 war) it served as a base of the Palmach (the Jewish Army before 48). I don’t know if the Palestinian owner escaped or was evicted, he lived in one floor and his daughter in another floor. My neighbour was in the Palmach (the Jewish army before 1948) and after the war of 1948 they told him go to the Katamon (the name of the Palestinian neighbourhood) and ‘to choose’ a house. So he had chosen one floor of this building. My neighbours downstairs also moved in 48 and then another family, religious family got in and 25 years ago they divided this floor, they threw a coin and decided who will take which side and then registered it in the Taabu (land and house registry). I bought my flat from the religious family. He then said to me: you give me money for the house, which I didn’t pay for... How do I feel with it? I used to think that I will never live in a house that was owned by Palestinians but now I think that in a situation of peace if the Palestinian owners would like to return back to live in the house I could get compensations form the government and leave. I have no problem to leave the house, I don’t feel belong, and I have no problem to give it back to its old owners. It will be so great if we could reach this stage (in the peace process)”(Elizabeth, 50’s, British-Israeli-Jewish, Jerusalem, 16.03.00)
I have chosen to open this paper with Elizabeth’s narrative on her life in Jerusalem.¹ This narrative reflects the daily dialectics of the notion of separated/shared spaces in the city by emphasizing the tragic history of Palestinian homeowners in West Jewish Jerusalem and the Jewish homeowners in the Palestinian Old City of Jerusalem. These ‘separated / shared spaces’ are becoming one of the major disputes in the future of the city today.

The aim of the paper is to introduce the daily practices and planning systems in Jerusalem which actually create situations of separated/ shared spaces in a city that has been officially declared as politically ‘united’. The paper begins with a brief background review of the current political, economic, social and cultural situation in the city, it then moves on to discuss the planning system in Israel and in the city highlighting its controlling nature especially towards the Palestinian residents of Jerusalem. Then, the case of Isawiye – a Palestinian village in East Jerusalem is presented to emphasize the problematic relationships between the Palestinian residents and the authorities. The paper concludes with some insights as to the role of the ‘politics of planning’ as shaping people’s everyday life in the city.

**The Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Context of Jerusalem**

Jerusalem, the Capital and the largest city in Israel, consisted in the year 2000 657,500 inhabitants, 11% of Israel’s total population. The city expands over 1.26 million hectares. It consists of the West - predominantly Jewish and the East - predominantly Palestinian. East Jerusalem has been occupied and annexed after the 1967 war by Israeli law, bringing it under its sovereignty and taking the whole and unified Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. The Palestinians reject the city’s unification by force and see East Jerusalem only as their Capital although using West Jerusalem services.

These current conflicts over the dominancy on the city can be seen as another chain in the city’s long history of battles and conflicts because of its holiness and contestation from time immemorial. Jerusalem is a trice holy city; being claimed by Jews, Christians and Muslims. The Jews attachment for Jerusalem dates back to biblical times when King David conquered the city towards the end of the eleventh century B.C. For Christians, Jerusalem’s holiness derives from Jesus lives in the area and his crucifixion there. For Muslims, Jerusalem’s primary religious significance springs from Muhamand’s miraculous voyage from Mecca to Jerusalem and from there to heaven. This tricky holiness has been a driving force throughout the city’s history. From the twentieth century onwards the religious issue regarding Jerusalem grad-

¹ This narrative is part of a research carried out in Jerusalem and London between 1999-2001, which dealt with urban planning and daily practices of the residents of the two cities. The research focused on three main themes reflecting quality of life in the city; comfort, belonging and commitment (Fenster, 2004)
ually became overshadowed by the emerging struggle between two national
groups, Jews and Palestinian Arabs. Religious beliefs and symbols have often
been intertwined with the conflicting aspirations of Zionism and Arab nation-
alism with Jerusalem becoming the major focus of contestation (Roman &
Weingrod, 1991). Its contested status is expressed in the fact that even its sta-
tus as the Capital of Israel is not fully internationally recognized. Most coun-
tries do adhere formally to decisions of the United Nations from 1940s that
Jerusalem should have an international status and recognize only that cease-
fire lines of 1948 and 1967 gave control over Jerusalem to Israel and thus
most countries embassies (including The USA, Britain, France) do not reside
in Jerusalem but in Tel Aviv (Sharkansky, 1996). Perhaps because of that some
of Israeli governments felt that it’s special status and religious and political
symbolism necessitates the creation of a government Ministry for Jerusalem.
Politicians wanting to assert their concern for the leading city of Israel often
touted this idea of a ministry for the city. The first ministry has been created
in 1991 but because of the increasing criticism it was abolished in 1992 and
never established again. However, this act shows the importance and perhaps
the lack of security that governments of Israel attribute and feel towards the
issue of Jerusalem.

Because of its uncertain status as the capital of Israel in the eyes of the inter-
national law, the ‘politics of planning and development’ in the city has been
targeted to maintain a Jewish majority in the city in what is termed: ‘the bat-
tle over demography’. The demographic balance in the year 2000 shows the
success of these policies: 68% of the city’s population are Jews, 32% are
Palestinians. The ratio between the two populations changes in different parts
of the city but it is always a Jewish majority, which dominates each area even
in East Jerusalem. For example, in the city centre area (East and West) there
are 76% Jews and 24% Palestinians. The total number of population in this
area is 117,000 inhabitants (these figures include the old city, and Jewish neigh-
bourhoods in west Jerusalem within this radius). In a distance of up to 4 km
from the city centre the population consists of 64% Jews and 36% Palestinians.
The total amount of people living in this area is 522,000, which are 79% from
the total population. In the third tier of 4 km and more from the city centre,
there are 157,000 inhabitants, 84% Jews and 16% Palestinians (Statistical
Yearbook of Jerusalem, 2000).

This ‘balanced’ ratio of Majority Jews is kept in two ways; First, a massive
expansion of the newly Jewish neighbourhoods or settlements (a terminology
which changes according to the political affiliation of the speakers), which were
built after 1967 on Palestinian lands surrounding Jerusalem as part of Israeli
government policies to Judiae Jerusalem. Second, in policies of discrimina-
tion towards the Palestinians citizens of Jerusalem, which are expressed in two
ways: The prevention of their neighbourhoods and villages expansion and the
discrimination in municipal budget allocated to municipal maintenance in
East Jerusalem. These two points will be elaborated later in the chapter.
East – West divisions have their distinct visual expressions too; The modernized style of West Jerusalem and Muslim style of East Jerusalem. The distinction between the two sides of the city is reflected not only in architecture but also in the different landscapes, the different development style, the different lifestyle and politics and the sharp gaps between the population's standard of livings and municipal budgets. But nationality is not the only division, which effects cityscape; it is also the division on a religious and an ethnic base among Jewish neighbourhoods especially between secular and religious neighbourhoods. The city is a collection of ghettos, mostly self-imposed. Palestinian and Jews, as well as secular and ultra-Orthodox Jews prefer their own neighbourhoods, schools, shopping areas, and newspapers (Sharkansky, 1996). And the ‘politics of planning and development’ of the municipality allow such ghettoization to take place to such an extent that some of the ultra orthodox neighbourhoods are becoming forbidden spaces for secular people to reside and secular women to use them with no interference of the municipality.

This social and cultural mosaic and especially the increasing dominancy of the ultra orthodox Jews in the city’s management is perhaps one of the motivations of the Jewish secular population to leave Jerusalem. The negative out migration from Jerusalem has increased from some 2846 people who left the city in 1990 to some 8000 who left the city in 1999 (Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem, 2000). There are no indications in the official statistics to the religious affiliations of those who left the city but it is well known that most of those are secular Jews. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why Jerusalem’s population is poorer, less employed and lives in a higher housing density than the average Israeli.2

Indeed, the economies of the city don’t take a leading part in current globalization movements. Moreover, as already mentioned above it is considered as a ‘poor city’, which depends on donations, sent from overseas and budget allocations of the national government concerned to maintain Israel’s hold over the city. The workforce is heavily engaged in the provision of government and other public services. Bureaucrats and politicians are more prominent than private capital or business firms (Sharkansky, 1996). Public and private investments work closely related in the development of the city. This was especially true in the period of Teddy Kolek, the former Mayor of Jerusalem (1966-1993). Three quasi-government organizations were prominent; The Jerusalem Foundation, the Jerusalem Development Authority and the Moriah Company. The Jerusalem

2 Consequently, it is Tel Aviv, the second largest city in Israel that takes the leading role in the globalized economy. Tel Aviv was declared as one of the 10 hi-tech centres in the world (Newsweek, 1998) with a high level of Internet users (some 360,000, with an annual growth rate of 30% (Yediot Hachronot Newspaper, 1998). The differences between the two cities reflect in recent figures on economic development. For example, during 1990-1998, 57% of the construction in Tel Aviv was housing construction and 27% offices and businesses. In Jerusalem, at the same period, 65% of construction projects were housing and only 9% offices and business. The differences between the two cities are reflected in their budget resources. 40% of the municipal taxes in Jerusalem come from dwellings while in Tel Aviv only 15% are covered from dwellings while 50% are covered by business taxes.
Foundation was in fact a private foundation based on a heavy fund raising mainly from Jews in the Diaspora. To the end of Kollek regime, it had supported a thousand projects from neighbourhoods playgrounds to building museums, sports fields, programs for dance, arts and drama mostly for Jews but it also invested money in bringing together Palestinian and Jews and in refurbishing churches and mosques side by side to synagogues. Its financial contribution to the city amounted some US $ 245 million from 1966-1991, which is some 10-15 percent of the municipality budget (Sharkansky, 1996). Kollek used to extract money from the municipality and the government to match the nongovernmental money that has been raised by the foundation.

The Christian and the Muslim communities in Jerusalem have their own well-established financial international support as well. The major Christian churches built their own cathedrals, monasteries, hospices, hospitals and schools along recent times. The Muslim religious trust (Waqt) has extensive land holding in West Jerusalem that supports the Muslims various activities in the city. Funds to Muslim institutions come from the Palestinian Authority and various Arab countries (Sharkansky, 1996).

We can see that the major forces, which shape Jerusalem's cityscapes, reflect religious and national interests, which find their expressions in the ways and means in which the 'politics of planning and development' in the city are articulated.

The Planning System in Israel and Jerusalem - Who's Power, Who's Knowledge?

The planning system in Israel is based on the 1965 Planning and Construction Act, which reflects a 'Modernized' version of the 1936 British Mandate Planning Ordinance. The Planning and Construction Act (1965) determines a top-down formal hierarchy of statutory master plans under which local construction plans should result from the local comprehensive plan. The local comprehensive plan derives from the regional master plan that stems from the national level. In reality, comprehensive planning appears to be rather static and out-of-date and in fact, comprehensive master plans are chasing the actual development instead of leading it. A research done by the governmental planning administration in 1997 discovers that the average preparation time of regional and local master plans is about 9 years. The same research reveals that 33% of local statutory master plans that existed at the time of the research aged 17 years or more. Only 28% aged 5 years or less. Moreover: 23 local master plans were in preparation at that time, 16 of them started the preparation processes 15 (!) years ago or more. This data tells us that in many cases the regional and local comprehensive master plan in Israel is practically absent and that urban regeneration and redevelopment just happens not necessarily with connections to plans.
During the 90s’, the formal planning administration initiated several amendments in order to flex its tools. Among those initiations one can find the Housing Construction Committees Act (VALAL) established in 1991 as amendments to the Planning and Construction Act. These were officially established to cut short the long procedures of plan’s approvals and in order to be able to prepare the ground for the 1 million immigrants from former USSR that were expected to arrive at the beginning of the 90s’. But in fact these short procedures also cut short the already limited options to object plans. At the end plans were approved and implemented with not enough attention paid to environmental issues, social impacts sufficient infrastructure and public spaces.

One of the important amendments in the 1965 Planning and Construction Law was the 43rd amendment, which has been completed during 1996. This amendment provides those who claim ownership on the area under planning, or those who have an interest in the area under planning to submit their own plan to the planning authorities, which in their turn have to discuss the plan. This amendment provides a legal opportunity for local initiations in planning. Several groups of residents in Jerusalem exploited this opportunity to submit their own plan to the authorities. Needless to say that these procedures are in many cases ‘Jewish exclusive’ leaving the non-Jewish citizens of Israel or the less advantaged groups within Jewish Israeli society as less powerful in using these options exist in the law to object plans (see for details on the Bedouin and Ethiopian planning schemes in: Fenster, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 a,b,c, 2001, 2002)

Another change in the formal planning approaches in Israel can be viewed in the “new planning language” offered by the 35th national plan looking at ‘planning tissues’ rather then planning zones. The 35th National Master plan has not yet been approved by the Government because of the objections raised from various interest groups whom make the process of approval longer then expected. However, in spite of all these changes, the local construction plan, traditionally located at the bottom of the planning tree is still considered as the strongest and the most relevant plan of all other hierarchical plans because this is the only plan which in fact materialized as compared to plans in higher hierarchies which are usually changing constantly. The bottom line of this situation is the crisis of the top-down planning system. Concrete initiatives that stem from both developers and public administrators are shaped into town or constructions plans and find their ways to be realized in urban landscape with the help of the local administration, almost without interference of the formal planning system. An emphasis of these tendencies is reflected in the changing policies of the Israel Land Authority, the most prominent actor in shaping the built environment, from a rigid and conservative policy of preserving agricultural state land to an economic and financial policy oriented which perceives land as an asset of maximized revenues as a target of development.

3 Planning tissues are areas of mixture of activities differently from the zoning principles which allocate one major land use to an area.
The official city planning document is the ‘City Outline Plan’ (COP) which indicates the future allocation of land uses in the municipal borders according to the expected and projected demand for housing, open spaces, areas for occupation, infrastructure, etc. These entire land uses, which are included in the plan, are expressed in both a map with areas allocated to the various land uses and ‘a text’ which provides the technical explanations of the map. It is usually a standard text with specific references to the specific plan. The text is usually professional — technical consisting of terminologies which are unfamiliar to the general public. The plan is prepared by independent planners (usually architects), which work outside the planning apparatus of the municipality or the government ministry but usually carry out most of the planning projects for the municipalities and the government ministries.

The planning process of the CPO is carried out by a team of professionals attended by a steering committee, which consists of representatives of various government offices. Their duty is to make sure that the interests they represent would be expressed in the plan. The plan is then discussed in the Local and District Committees in which more alterations can take place. Before the plan is approved it is deposited to the public to allow submissions of objections from the public. This is a very problematic process, as the public could learn about planning projects and the right to object to those projects only from special ads published in newspapers. This is in fact the only form of participation exist in the Planning and Building Law in Israel, which is another indicator of its centralistic character.

The Planning System in Jerusalem

The city’s planning system is complex and different than other Israeli cities primarily as it has to deal with a large number of ‘actors’ local and global. Land tenants in Jerusalem include Palestinian and Jewish private owners, Churches and Waqf owners and the state as another landowner. This structure of landowners and the fact that Jerusalem serves as a focus of global—religious and local—national interests makes city planning and management a complex procedure. In this respect, Jerusalem is a unique case of such a large number of powers, global and local that are involved in the city planning and management (Bollens, 2000) and because of its nationalist symbols and ideological emotions regarding space and territory, its development concerns a deep involvement of international, national and the local planning authorities.

4 These ads usually appear in back pages in very small letters with ‘planning’ information which is not known to the majority of the public, for example; the location of the area where the planning takes place is indicated in terms of region/plot number rather than simply indicating the street name and number. Lately, this later information has become part of the text presented in the advertisement but the ad is still not the main chain in which people learn about developments in their area
Similar to the Israeli planning system, the Jerusalem planning system consists of two main channels. The first is the formal, statutory system, a part of the hierarchical administration by law system, led by the Ministry of Interior. The second is the local initiative developmental system which is more dynamic, pragmatic and active and includes other ‘actors’ such as the Ministry of Housing, the Israeli Land Authority and private entrepreneurs. These initiatives have to be compatible with the official statutory plan of the city and to undergo the official administrative procedures for their approvals. However, developers often try and sometimes succeed in using their connections with national or local elected officials to overturn the planners’ objections to their own initiatives. Sometimes they win their case on the claim that a project will provide substantial tax revenues to the municipal treasury. Sometimes they assert that an international hotel chain will add its prestige to Israel and Jerusalem. The Jerusalem Plaza Hotel for example was built by a well-connected group of foreign investors on the site that had been zoned to remain part of the only sizable public park close to the central business district (Sharkansky, 1996). At the city level, the main actors are the Local Planning and Building Committee, which is subordinated to the Jerusalem District Planning, and Building Committee. This is the planning body where most of the national government decisions regarding Jerusalem are and can be taken without the consultation of the municipality (Bollens, 2000).

Although the city is officially ‘united’ Since 1967, the city have neither a comprehensive outline plan for the ‘unified city’ nor a ‘Master Plan’ for the entire city although such a plan is under work these days. The first plan to address the unified city was the 1968 Master Plan for Jerusalem, which has never been approved as such, and no subsequent Town Planning Scheme has been developed from it (Bollens, 2000). Subsequently, a comprehensive Outline Plan for Jerusalem has been prepared in 1975 and approved by the local committee in 1977 but has been rejected by the District Committee (B’tselem, 1997). The Outline Plan still in use today until the new outline plan is approved is the 1959 plan, which has been set up ten years before the ‘unification’ of the city. Hopefully, this new outline plan for the city could bridge the gap between the local massive planning and development of Jewish projects in East Jerusalem and the necessity of a broader perspective of the city’s development both for Jewish and Palestinians.

Decentralization and Planning in Jerusalem

The municipality functions at the local level by means of centralistic bureaucracies that are similar to the centralistic ways that the central government function in the state. The municipal system is central to the extent that Jerusalem’s municipal employees can make arbitrary decisions that are fateful for individual citizens, without explaining their reasons or providing access to the information that is used in making the decisions (Sharkansky, 1996).
Side by side to these strong centralistic tendencies there are some local initiatives, which force the system to decentralize. One of those is the initiation carried out by several of Jerusalem's neighbourhoods to establish associations of residents, some function in Palestinian neighbourhoods. These associations are funded by donors outside Israel such as American Jewish donors for Jewish associations and Saudi Arabia, Jordanian and PLO donors for Palestinian neighbourhoods. The Palestinian associations serve as vehicle for the residents to express their concerns in a setting where they refuse to vote or otherwise take part in activities of the Israeli state or municipality. In 1991 there were 13 neighbourhood associations with one hundred employees but today most of them ceased functioning.

Another official effort to decentralize governance in Jerusalem happened when Teddy Kollek the pervious mayor tried to divide all of Jerusalem into the London boroughs system with the hope that it would provide each of them a measure of self-government. This, he thought, would be a pragmatic way to deal with the city's diversity while maintaining the city united under Israeli control. The idea was opposed by Orthodox Jewish politicians who had seen it as a way to evade Sabbath regulations in secular neighbourhoods and by right wing politicians, which had seen it as the first step in the re-division of Jerusalem into Jewish and Palestinian. In 1992, the idea was emerged again but was rejected again from the same reasons.

Another program, which was meant to improve decentralization in local governance in Israel was the neighbourhood renewal project created by the late Prime Minister Begin in 1978. This project aimed to serve as a focus of fund-raising among overseas Jewish communities, to alleviate the social and economic problems of poor urban neighbourhoods and small towns, and to involve site residents and overseas donors in project planning and management. The attitudes towards this project are mixed both by residents and by the municipality. Several Jerusalem neighbourhoods have benefited from the project in terms of physical improvements in run down housing as well as social programs. But there have been also frustrated confrontations between local residents, representatives of overseas donors and Israeli bureaucrats over the components and the priorities that the project set up. During mid 80's there emerged another initiation, this time outside the establishment to set up neighbourhood governance, which would represent the residents voices (Hasson, Schory, Adiv, 1995). The aim has been to promote urban democracy and increase decentralization and self-management in the neighborhoods. There were 14 such neighbourhood governance in Jerusalem in 1995.

Additionally, there is a large tier of NGO's activities that are functioning in the city, some work in Jerusalem and others work on a national scale but their headquarters are based in Jerusalem. They are financed by special donors and work on various issues usually related to human rights, citizen actions and participation.
Nationalistic Power and Planning as Control – The ‘Policies of Planning and Development’ in Jerusalem

As already mentioned before, one of the main targets of the policies of planning and development in Jerusalem is to maintain the Jewish majority in the city. The two main channels to realize this goal are; a vast Jewish development and expansion and a lack of Palestinian development and improvement. The result is that although Israeli Governments declare Jerusalem as united, the city is one-sided managed (Yiftachel, Yacobi, 2002). This means that urban governance; urban economies and services are targeted towards the Jewish inhabitants in spite of the fact that the Palestinians consist of more of a quarter of its population.

Practically speaking, most economic and planning efforts are targeted in expanding and modernizing Jewish areas as part of the policy of Judaization of large parts of East Jerusalem and its surrounding hills. The means to achieve this goal are many: expropriating Palestinian lands, construction of Jewish neighbourhoods or settlements on these lands, restrictions on Palestinian building and land use through the adoption of planning policies, residency regulations and other measures, determining restricted housing capacity for the Palestinian population while encouraging Jewish population by means of financial subsidies to move to Jerusalem, declaring ‘open landscapes areas’ near existing Palestinian villages thus preventing their natural expansion and converting houses already built in these areas into illegal and at the same time building Jewish neighbourhoods (such as Pisgat Ze’ev) on areas previously declared as green areas. Indeed, these policies were successful. In 1993 for example, the Israeli government announced the Jewish population in East Jerusalem to be 155000, surpassing the Palestinian population of 150000 in the same area (Malki, 2000).

Another expression of these policies is that Jewish religious people started to reside in Palestinian neighbourhoods and within the Muslim quarter in the Old City. The Ministry of Housing in particular carried out this later policy along the years. These policies were initiated and implemented sometimes against the municipality policy especially during the leadership of the former mayor Teddy Kollek. Since his predecessor Ehud Olmert was elected in 1993 these policies were even more dominant when the government and the municipality work hand by hand to implement various policies concerning the judaization of the city. Between 1967 and 1995, 76,151 housing units were built in Jerusalem out of which 64,867 (88%) were for Jewish residents, 59 percent of those were built in new Jewish neighbourhoods in East Jerusalem (B’tselem, 1997).

Another expression of the policies of Judaization of Jerusalem is the determination of its municipal boundaries. In spite of being a planning issue, the boundary drawing of Jerusalem was not made by planners but rather by the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) officers with the purpose to include the maximum territory possible with minimum Palestinian population (Chesin, 2000). As
the primary purpose of the boundary drawing was political i.e., to include maximum land and the exclude maximum Palestinians (Bollens, 2000) with no consideration taken on planning perspective, the city’s boundaries exclude areas which functionally belong to the city thus creating ‘an artificial construct’ (Faludi, 1997) and legitimising any development as municipal and not into the ‘occupied territories’. Thus, The Jordanian (pre-1967 rule) East Jerusalem consists of only 6 square km but Israel annexed an area of almost 70 square km to the municipal boundaries of West Jerusalem of which 64 square km consist of 28 villages in the West Bank surrounding the city, obviously for political purposes (B’tselem, 1997). At the same time, Israel has deliberately left out the newly created East Jerusalem’s neighbourhoods such as Abu - Dis that the Palestinians see as an integral part of the city. This is in spite of the fact that East Jerusalem has for decades been the political and spiritual centre of the Palestinian national movement as well as the geographical and economic link between the northern and southern parts of the West Bank and between the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Ma’oz, 2000). The 1993 closure was another trigger in disconnecting East Jerusalem from its hinterland. Bus companies, which operated regularly from East Jerusalem to the cities in the west bank, were forced to reduce their trip frequencies because of the closure and especially since the rise of the second Intifada in October 2000 (Maliki, 2000).

The Palestinians in the metropolitan region of Jerusalem are given residency rights but not Israeli citizenship. As residences they carry the ‘blue’ identity card like any other Israeli citizens. Their blue identity card allow them a free move within Israel, which is forbidden for the Palestinians who live in West Bank and Gaza who do not carry blue ID cards. Moreover, it allows them to work within Israel whereas the Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip need to have special permissions to work in Israel, a situation, which has become more and more difficult as the latest political conflict accelerates. But this ‘Blue ID’ also serves them as a mechanism which separates them from those living in adjoining localities that remained in the ‘occupied territories’ of West Bank and Gaza Strip with no residency or movement rights in the city and in the country at large. This situation has a double effect: The Palestinian residents of Jerusalem are excluded from the city’s forums of decision - making due to their refusal to accept the imposition of Israeli law. At the same time, the Palestinians living in the adjoining localities cannot use the City as an urban centre because they have no movement rights. As a result, East Jerusalem ceased to function as the urban metropolitan centre for its Palestinian hinterland and it’s role as the capital of the West Bank ceased to exist.

These policies of control both reflected in planning and development and in the restrictions of freedom of movement have brought the Palestinian situation to an absurd. In terms of their own planning rights, it is impossible for them to build their houses within the legal frameworks of their localities because the ‘blue line’, that is the boundaries of their neighbourhoods and villages were determined so that there is no room for new houses to be built. The demo-
graphic contested manipulation is becoming an arena of municipal regulation and building permit issues. Between 1968 to 1974 only 58 permits were issued. In recent years about 150 permits per year were issued. The total number of permits which were issued between 1967 to 1999 is 2950 when the Palestinian population grew from 68,000 to 180,000, which means that out of the total 19,650 Palestinian homes built in East Jerusalem after 1967 war, 16,700 do not have permit and therefore are considered as illegal and face demolition threats and heavy financial fines (Amnesty, 1999).

Practically it means that nearly one half of the Palestinian population of East Jerusalem live under threat of having their houses demolished. By that, the current Israeli policy excludes the majority of the Palestinians in Jerusalem by turning them into an illegal position. In reality however, only a small numbers of demolitions were realized: 284 houses out of 12,000 or 2.3 percent. Each house demolition is widely covered by the media in Israel and abroad and is followed by protests of human rights organization both Israeli and Palestinians. At the same time, there are many additions to private homes in the Jewish sector without the formal approvals that are necessary (Sharkansky, 1996). These policies have different labelling in the literature. Faludi (1997) calls them the ‘political doctrine of planning’ and Bollens (2000) defines this situation as the ‘partisan approach to urban planning’. This means focusing on planning and development for one group of residents, the Jewish in this case while discriminating the Palestinian residents according to Israeli law. This labelling of illegality provides Israeli authorities with the right under its laws to demolish buildings for lack of building permits. Bollens (2000) calls it the ‘municipalisation’ of what in reality are decisions with international connotations. Political Planning serves here as a central tool in the creation of discrimination situations in Jerusalem through those exclusionary policies and projects. This situation resulted not only in deep discrimination and frustration among the Palestinians and Jews living in the city but also in increasingly international criticisms and even condemnations.

In spite of these discriminatory policies the Palestinians remain in the city and stay to live on their land. It is called ‘zumud’-staying on the land, resistance, on going presence in the city and around it and building as a major part of it. It is not an independent policy with explicit goals as some of the Israelis see it. It is rather spontaneous, not coordinated or planned in advance by the national or local Palestinian leadership (Klein, 2001). The story of Isawiye, a Palestinian village located at the outskirts of Jerusalem illustrates the ‘national political planning narrative’, which dictates everyday life of the Palestinians in Jerusalem.

**Nationalist Power and Control in Isawiye Village Planning Narrative**

The planning history of Isawiye illustrates the tragic situation of the Palestinians in Jerusalem. Isawiye is located east to The French Hill - a Jewish
neighbourhood built on their expropriated land. As Jewish development expands in the area their land is becoming more and more in demand by the municipality. Before 1967, the residents of the village owned some 10 000 dunams but some of their land has been appropriated by the Jordanians so that after 1967 when the area became part of the Israeli occupation they possessed 2700 dunams only. The location of the village in proximity to the renewed Hebrew University in Mount Scopus made it attractive for developing Jewish neighbourhoods, and thus, some 800 dunams of their land were expropriated by the Israeli authorities to build the French Hill Jewish neighbourhood.

But this was not enough since the municipality has still been interested in expropriating more land, as Isawiye’s lands had become part of the city’s outskirts. For that purpose, the municipality prepared an outline plan for Isawiye, which includes only between 680-700 dunams as the village’s ‘legal’ area out of the 1900 dunams they possessed while the rest of the village lands (some 1200 dunam) were intended to be expropriated for Jewish development in the future (Kaminker, interview, 31/10/01). Moreover, the municipality’s planners allocated a large area of the village as a ‘green zone’ although it is a residential area at present. By that, the houses in the area are becoming illegal although were built many years ago. The planners allocated at present only 270 dunam for housing in an area which is already built (mainly the village centre) and which is the most densely populated area in the village. The residents of Isawiye want the municipality to plan their village on the whole 1900 dunam they own and not on the 270 dunam that the authorities planned. This is mainly because the area that the municipality planned for them is already heavily populated and therefore the municipality plan doesn’t meet their housing needs. The Director of the Department of Planning Policy at the Jerusalem Municipality explains that the principle of green belt area is actually inherited from the British planning system. The green belt area principle appears in a plan prepared for East Jerusalem in 1919 and later in another plan for Jerusalem prepared in 1944. The idea of the green belt area was to preserve the unique visual aspects of the Old City by preventing any construction and development in the areas declared as green - belt preservation areas (interview, 02/02/02). As it happened these green belt preservation areas fall within Isawiye lands and thus are officially used as the reason to prevent housing construction in most of its lands. This is an illustration of how colonial perceptions sometimes find their ways of becoming tools and mechanisms of control over minority groups, reflecting perhaps ‘new colonial expressions’.

The outline plan of Isawiye, which has been prepared without consulting the residents, was published in 1992. The residents of Isawiye objected the plan. Their leader says: ‘These are stupid plans, political plans. The plans are not meant to serve the population needs’ (14.11.01). The level of housing density is becoming intolerable and many houses becoming illegal the residents organized themselves with a help of a freelance urban planner to prepare an alter-
native outline plan to the village which has become possible according to the newly 43rd amendment in the 1965 Planning and Construction Law (see section before). Using this new possibility the residents and the freelance planner have tried to get the funds to prepare such a plan. This process has been halted since the beginning of the second Intifada (uprising) in September 2000.

The hardship that the residents of Isawiye face is expressed in what their leader say:

"We're lacking in the village every aspect of infrastructure; roads, schools, street lights, sidewalks, public parks, community centre, we have no postal services, no water supply... I asked the municipality so many times to do something about it... we have the village's main road that the municipality started constructing in 1997 and haven't finished it till today. Loads of holes in the roads... there is no appropriate drainage system and in winter there are floods. When we talk to the municipality they say they don't have enough budget so I ask them how come you have enough budget for the Jewish neighbourhood 'the French Hill' they say; Don't talk politics! So I say: those who demand their rights talk politics? We pay municipal taxes (arnona), as much as the Jewish neighbourhoods pay and even more why can't we get the same level of services? " (Interview, 07.11.01)

The village leader clearly expresses the bitterness and frustration that the Palestinian residents of Jerusalem and the outskirts suffer. On the one hand, they feel part of Jerusalem and therefore they pay taxes to the municipality (arnona). On the other hand they feel discriminated because they are not given the services they are entitled for their tax payments. Their sense of belonging is complicated; they do feel residents of Jerusalem but not the residents of the Israeli occupied Jerusalem. It is a vicious cycle. They do not vote for the municipality elections as an act of protest against the Israeli occupation. But because of that they do not have their representatives in the municipality councils to watch out their needs and rights.

When I met the people from Isawiye (November, 2001) they were in the middle of a crisis. The police and the army blocked one of the roads leading from their village to the centre of Jerusalem. The reason for this blockage was stone throwing from the village to the roads in the area as part of the intifada, the Palestinian uprising that started in September 2000. As in previous cases, while the criminals are individuals the punishment is collective. The residents of Isawiye were furious and wanted to protest but their leader made efforts to calm the anger down and to sort out the problems peacefully. When I met them they were about to meet the chief police and an IDF officer in order to sort out the situation peacefully. When we met next, in the following week they just came back from another meeting with the police where they've reached an agreement that the blocked road will be opened and the leaders will make efforts not to let stone throwing from the village area. This event is only one emphasis of the hardship that the Palestinian population undergone in such troubled times of the Intifada and their leaders are trapped between those youth that choose to fight against the Israel occupation using various ways from stone
throwing to suicidal bombing and the strong reaction of the Israeli authorities towards such acts. I myself was hesitant to visit the village, a place where I would easily visit only a year before. It was only when the village leader assured me that it is safe to walk around the village in his company that I was willing to go. Identity issues and politics have become a major component in of carrying out this research in my own residential city - Jerusalem.

To sum this section, in Jerusalem ‘political planning’ has its expressions mainly in favour of one nationality to the other, using professional tools and planning mechanisms to control and oppress the Palestinian population in the city. These policies may have been successful in terms of maintaining the Jewish – Palestinian Ratio in the city but they have proved to be a failure in that they’ve created strong feelings of resistance, frustration and hate and thus pushing back the chances of establishing a civil and just society in the holy city.

Concluding Notes: Jerusalem’s Separated and Shared Spaces - Who’s Planning, Who’s Power, Who’s Diversity?

Jerusalem is an example of the way ‘the politics of planning and development’ function so that they reflect power relations and control. Power relations are the core issue in understanding the ‘planning games’ which shape and re-shape cityscapes. Several issues have been highlighted in the paper which emphasizes the ways separated and shared spaces are created and function in the city:

• ‘The politics of planning’ express nationalist goals of the Judaization of the city using professional tools and planning mechanisms to control and oppress the Palestinian population in the city. This battle involves the ideological/nationalist hegemony and dominancy of the Jewish establishment and the Palestinian local communities.

• How planning in Jerusalem uses the same old tools for control; land expropriations, zoning principles, planning gains, etc. to win this battle. This practice is typical not only to Jerusalem but also to London (Fenster, 2004). In both cities planning has become narrowly functional oriented action rather than comprehensive. This situation is similar to Harvey’s (1987) view of planning as coordination of the interests of business and the planners play the role of facilitators of specific projects rather than extended comprehensively to the relationships of projects to each other and to the housing and transit systems.

• Jerusalem’s triple holiness made it an important ‘global’ city from a religious point of view. Churches have land assets in the city, which make them one of the active actors of planning games in the city. There are private-public deals between the government of Israel and the various churches which function in Jerusalem as real estate owners.

• The lack of recognition of difference reflects both at the national and municipal level. It is a national -territorial ideology, which uses urban plan-
ning, and governance to reduce spaces of citizenship for the Palestinian on the account of cutting notions of comfort in their everyday life. Politics of difference are by and large far from realization as long as the government of Israel and the Jerusalem municipality fight for preserving the sole Jewish identity of Jerusalem’s territory on the account of the Palestinian identity of its residents.

This paper has emphasized how urban planning and development can serve political and territorial nationalistic purposes. This situation exists in many cities in the world where urban planning serves different interests in each of them (economic, social, cultural, religious and political to name a few). What makes the case of Jerusalem perhaps different is the extent to which such ‘politics of planning and development’ have their strong, explicit and sometimes traumatic daily effects on the different communities and individuals living in the city by creating real and symbolic separate spaces. Only the future can tell if these separated spaces could become shared ones transforming the city into a more human place to live for people of different religions and nationalities.

Bibliography

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