Anuari de la Societat Catalana de Filosofia, XV, 2003, pp. 23-33

COMMENTS ON THE SESSION OF PROFESSOR T. M. ROBINSON

[Societat Catalana de Filosofia,
Barcelona 18th November 2003][1]

[A. BOSCH-VECIANA] Good afternoon. We are pleased to have Professor Thomas M. Robinson, of the Department of Philosophy of the University of Toronto (Canada), again with us. He visited us on an earlier occasion when he was in Barcelona. So, welcome again Professor Robinson.

Professor Thomas M. Robinson, whom I met during the early hours of the *V Symposium Platonicum*, which took place in Toronto from August 19 to 23, 1995, and was dedicated to the study of the *Euthydemus*, the *Lysis* and the *Charmides*, has written tirelessly about Plato and about Greek philosophy as a whole. One of his more remarkable texts is undoubtedly *Plato's Psychology* (University of Toronto Press, 1970; second edition 1995). He has also published *Contrasting Arguments: An Edition of the* Dissoi Logoi (1979), *The Greek Legacy* (1979) and *Heraclitus: Fragments* (1987). And he has recently completed three volumes of articles on ancient philosophy. He has given courses and lectured in universities all over the world. In fact, he is well known to us, and no more introduction is needed. We would just like to thank him for being here with us to engage in dialogue about Plato while he is currently in Europe to give papers in a number of universities. [*De fet és conegut de nosaltres i no en cal més presentació. Tan sols agrair-li el fet d'haver volgut estar entre nosaltres per dialogar sobre Plató, amb la possibilitat que li donava la seva estada a Europa en ocasió d'impartir conferències a diverses universitats. Donem-li la paraula i seguidament iniciarem un diàleg amb ell.*]

IS THERE A PLATONIC APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY?

[THOMAS M. ROBINSON] Plato's writing lifetime encompassed something like half a century. His extensive writings, some 36 of them, appear to have survived, miraculously, in their entirety. Since he would, by any reckoning, have described himself as a philosopher, in at least the etymo-

1. Notes edited by Josep Monserrat-Molas (grup Hermenèutica i Platonisme).

logical sense of the word if nothing more than that, it should in principle be relatively simple to excavate from such a mass of material what one might call a 'Platonic approach' to philosophy. But notoriously this has proved to be something on which there has been from the beginning and continues to be sharp disagreement among interpreters, ranging from those who believe that Platonism consists simply of a philosophical approach, such that the philosophy and the method of philosophizing are one and the same, to those who believe that the method, roughly describable as 'dialogical', is, among other things, a device for the elaboration of major 'doctrine', such as the theory of transcendental forms or the immortality of the soul. In my paper I shall be looking again at this problem, and asking myself two specific questions, as follows:

If the major approach to philosophy to be found in the dialogues is indeed the 'dialogical' one, is it the only approach, and if there are others, what are they?

If it turns out to be the case that there is indeed more to Platonism than simply a dialogical approach to things, can we pin-point what it is?

We can begin with the question of the dialogical approach to philosophy. This seems too obvious to merit more than a moment's attention. Until, that is, one looks at, say, the Timaeus and the Critias, which have given up all pretence of being dialogues, or the last great work on which Plato was working at his death, the Laws, where again we are effectively looking at a treatise rather than a dialogue. However, it could be argued that the *Laws* is still at least vaguely dialogical in structure, and the nature of the contents of the *Timaeus* and *Critias*, it could be argued, are such that Plato made a deliberate and very understandable exception in their case. Which would leave us with the still-standing, unexceptionable claim that, by and large, Plato approached the problems of philosophy dialogically.

As we have already seen, for some interpreters, like Randall, and more recently, Paviani, the approach and the philosophy are one; a philosopher uses dialogue as a technique to unmask hidden assumptions about various terms (usually to do with ethics), and to achieve as much clarity as we can in the matter by this technique, whether or not we reach such a degree of clarity that we can finally agree on an acceptable definition of the term in question. But in putting their case this way Randall and Paviani and those who think like them have made life easy for themselves in accepting so unified a vision of the dialogues when this is in fact a major point at issue for so many other interpreters. Vlastos, for example, spent much of a lifetime arguing that the so-called 'Socratic' or early dialogues of Plato, which end almost invariably with a failure to define the term they had set out to define, practice exactly the philosophy attributed by Randall and Paviani and others to Plato, but it is only those dialogues which unequivocally do so. Many of the later dialogues, by contrast, beginning with the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*, despite the presence in many of them of a persona called Socrates, have as their clear agenda the elaboration of doctrine based on carefully constructed definitions (like the definition of justice in the *Republic*); with rare exceptions (like the *Theaetetus*), they finish up defining their moral terms with some exactitude.

On this interpretation, only dialogues from the *Phaedo* and *Republic* onwards are indisputable sources for any talk of a 'Platonic' approach to philosophy. Small, early dialogues like the *Lysis* or *Euthydemus*, may on occasion contain thoughts which, proleptically (to use Kahn's term), may prefigure some of Plato's later thinking (the *Gorgias*, for example, can be seen, in terms of its contents, as something of a dry-run for the *Republic*), but philosophy-as-method, if that is what the early dialogues consist of, is either a) purely Socratic, or b) something attributed to Socrates by Plato, whether or not Socrates would have recognized the portrait of himself, or c) something Plato himself adhered to while writing these early dialogues (presumably thinking he was following Socrates in so doing) but turned away from later in life to embark on some philosophical system-building of his own.

A further complication to all this is added by the fact that, whatever their differences, real or supposed, Socrates and Plato would undoubtedly have agreed that philosophy must be lived. But then they might very likely have disagreed, at least in part, on the matter of what constituted living. For Socrates such living seems to have been a very inward-looking 'care of the soul', with a minimum of attention (though real enough and often hazardous enough, as we know from both Xenophon and Plato) to affairs of state and basic civic duties, and a maximum of attention to 'getting things right' as far as possible by the technique of public dialogue. For Plato much of this would remain true, but from the time of writing of the Republic onwards, which, on a Vlastos-style interpretation of the dialogues, is more or less where a Platonic as distinct from a Socratic approach to philosophy begins, Plato is deeply committed to a maximal not a minimal attention by all citizens, consonant with their talents and education, to affairs of state and basic civic duties. Or to put it a little differently, on a Vlastos-style interpretation of the dialogues Socrates tends to emphasize saving one's own soul, Plato to emphasize saving the state and no doubt thereby one's individual soul as well.

While there is some plausibility to this general argument, I plan to accept as my own ground-rule of interpretation something slightly different. And different again, I should add, from the view of those who take Socratic/Platonic method and Platonism to be synonymous. Scanning the works of Plato from what by general consent is the earliest or very close to the earliest that was written, the *Apology*, to the one on which he was working when he died, the *Laws*, I shall attempt to bring to the fore philosophical stances and commitments which seem to me to be there for the entire writing period, on the assumption that *for Plato if not for Socrates the dialogue form was a means to an end not an end in itself, that end being the exposition of some deep commitments that may have been simply adumbrated earlier on* but were then argued for with the passage of time. This may have some disconcerting results for various groups of interpreters, *since a number of the commitments that I highlight will turn out to permeate both the Socratic and the Platonic dialogues (on a Vlastosian interpretation), while others, even if confined, on that same interpretation, to so-called Platonic dialogues, will turn out to be less robustly affirmed than they are sometimes made out to be*.

Starting with the latter, one of the twin pillars of Platonism, as they have been called since Cornford, the *Theory of Forms, is only indubitably a part of Platonic thinking in five dialogues, the Phaedo, Symposium, Republic, Timaeus and Phaedrus*, along perhaps with the *Parmenides*, where, despite the criticisms levelled against it in the opening pages of that dialogue, a Theory of Forms, of something very like it, seems to be re-affirmed as being philosophically indispensable. Many scholars find further references to the Forms in the *Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, *Politicus* and *Philebus* and even *Laws* as well, though other scholars (and this includes myself) are much less sure, and feel that by this stage Plato *has begun thinking of essences in re while still retaining a language that once evoked transcendentalism.* Either way, *there is very little reason to believe that, till he wrote the Symposium and Phaedo, perhaps around the age of forty, Plato adhered to a theory of transcendental forms, or that Socrates himself ever held any such theory. So the theory of forms as putatively transcendental entities, despite its fame and pivotal importance for a large part of Plato's writing life, in fact fails to meet my 'life-time philosophical commitment' criterion as an objective of the dialogic method.*

What of the other 'pillar of Platonism', the theory of the immortality of the soul? This, on the face of it, seems to be a much stronger claimant to such a title, since it seems to be affirmed across the dialogues from start to finish, with various attempts at proof being put forward in the *Phaedo*, *Republic*, *Phaedrus* and *Laws*. There are slight anomalies in the *Apology*, where Socrates seems to believe in an after-life but not necessarily an eternal one, and in the *Symposium*, where the eternality of the human race is affirmed, in a context which appears to contrast this with unacceptable claims to personal immortality. But this latter should probably be excluded from the discussion as being simply an anomaly, given the enormous weight of evidence across the dialogues pointing in the opposite direction, and the *Apology* excluded from the discussion as being clearly an attempt to re-create recent court proceedings, and as such separate and different in kind from the dialogues to come.

If this is true, *the theory of immortality will successfully meet the 'life-time philosophical commitment' criterion. But we run into difficulties as soon as we pose the question, The immortality of what?* The attempted *proofs* of immortality scattered across the dialogues, from the *Phaedo* to the *Laws*, strongly suggest that for Plato the only human soul he considered immortal was the *rational human soul*. In his various eschatological *myths*, however, he presents a portrait of the human soul in the afterlife as in effect an disembodied person wholly analogous to the embodied person, and complete with *emotional* apparatus. The two visions are not, on the face of it, compatible. One obvious solution to the puzzle is to credit *Plato* with the view of soul as purely *reason* and *Socrates*, perhaps, with the more generally accepted view of soul as reason combined with *impulse* (?). This may well be correct, but one can never discount, even in the case of a philosopher of the high intelligence of Plato, the extraordinary ability of humans to hold in the mind simultaneously ideas that cannot in fact be reconciled. And on these grounds we must, I think, *leave the matter cautiously unresolved, not least because Plato himself seems content to do so.*

If one of the so-called 'pillars of Platonism' has so far proved to be no real pillar at all and the other one perhaps shaky, are we to conclude that the search for something generally characterizable as a 'Platonic approach' to philosophy, whether in terms of method or the elaboration of certain basic tenets, or both, is not going to prove fruitful? That would, I think, be a hasty conclusion, given how much more there is going on in the dialogues than what those two pillars constitute, and it is to some of these things that I now turn.

First, the method. It is very possibly the case (though who could ever prove it?) that, in his earliest dialogues, Plato himself, along with Socrates, adhered to the view that the value of dialogue is the technique rather than any hope of a positive conclusion to the argument, and that such a technique constituted both the correct approach to philosophy and the nature of philosophy itself. And also possibly the case that, as his writing life progressed, he came to think that the technique could actually produce positive results, such as the definition of justice in the Republic, the Theory of Forms, and the doctrine of immortality. On such a scenario it could reasonably be argued that the fil conducteur uniting both of these periods in Plato's writing life was a commitment, and a commitment he never abandoned, to the *dialogic method as the most appropriate approach to philosophy,* whether or not it also actually constituted philosophy as such. This would remain true even if, as seems to be the case, the quality of the dialogue tended to decline in some of the later works, such as to be on occasion so exiguous (as in, say, the *Timaeus*) as to be barely apparent. Had he really wished to abandon the method he would presumably have done so by the time of the writing of his last work, the *Laws*, but it is in fact still very much present there, with some lively interventions at various points by the Athenian Stranger's two companions.

As far as major philosophical tenets that go hand in hand with the technique are concerned, I would single out *psycho-physical dualism, a belief in providential divinity, a teleological vision of the world, a functionalist and essentialist metaphysics, physics, psychology and ethics, and a specific commitment to the view that justice in the soul and in society is a state of balance within each; and along with these a belief in the soundness of a number of maxims often thought of as quintessentially 'Socratic', such as 'the unexamined life is not worth living', 'no-one does evil wittingly', 'it is always better to be the recipient of evil than to* *commit it', and in general terms, the worst evil I can perpetrate on another person is to make him or her worse as a person.*

To look briefly at each of these: the psycho-physical dualism seems clear enough, despite Plato's ongoing puzzlement about the details, which pre-occupy him for a lifetime. The same can be said for his views on divinity, which range all the way from some of the popular beliefs found in the various eschatological myths to the astral theology that characterizes the Laws; what is invariant is his view that God/the gods/the divine is rational, providential and wholly just –a notion absolutely revolutionary for the Greece of his day.

Equally striking (and revolutionary) are his teleological vision of the world, and his functionalism and essentialism. These extraordinarily influential notions, which underpin Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* and a great swath of philosophical speculation till relatively recent times, are to be found as simple presuppositions from the earliest dialogues on, and are finally explicitly argued for in some detail in the closing pages of Republic 1. In contemporary terms, Plato's is a 'thing' ontology rather than a 'fact' ontology, where the mind sees objects rather that appreciates states of affairs, and his ethical system one in which actions and objectives are characterizable in terms of what they are deemed to be essentially and absolutely, rather than in terms of simply their consequences.

As far as the so-called 'Socratic' maxims are concerned, all are retained by Plato to the end. And, it could be argued, implemented too; if in the dialogues we are looking for a distinctive Platonic approach to philosophy, we probably need look no further than his determination to keep on doggedly re-examining, following Socrates' maxim, what he took to be matters of vital importance for the living of a truly virtuous (and hence truly fulfilled) life. Like the nature of justice, and of a just society, tackled at great length, and from a multiplicity of angles, in three complete dialogues as well as more briefly in others. Or the notion that no one does evil wittingly, which is still exercising him –and puzzling him– in extreme old age, as he writes the *Laws*. Or the notion that it is better to suffer evil than to do it. It is, of its nature, an approach which involves an openness to change, even major change, of view on topics of central importance, even though, paradoxically, Plato was himself attracted to order and balance, and, if possible, total changelessness once such order and balance is achieved, especially in the realms of art and politics. If unnumbered searchers after truth find themselves instinctively drawn to the honesty and integrity of such an approach, whatever their views on anything else he adhered to, it is hardly surprising. And any who might feel inclined to dispute it face a strong challenge in coming up with an approach of their own which they deem more defensible.

Dialogue

[A. Bosch-Veciana] I would like to start with a twofold question. First, on the matter of evolution in Platonic dialogues, and, second, on the dialogues understood as *synousia*.

First of all, then, we must bear in mind as an interpretative principle that Platonic dialogues constitute complete works on their own. If we do not understand them as totalities, we run the risk of failing to understand them. As happens with Shakespeare's works, each one has its own sense when taken as a whole; any fragments from them are to be understood in the context of the whole of a given work. Whether, after the fact, we can talk about a possible 'evolution' of doctrine in the Platonic dialogues remains open to question. We must also bear in mind the indissociable interconnectedness present in Platonic dialogues –as in all works, in general– between form and content, as Schleiermacher emphasized.

Secondly, in Platonic philosophy, the character Socrates invariably appears in dialogical meetings, in *synousia* with various interlocutors. For these meetings, Plato offers us details on the place, the *situs*, where the discussion takes place: we must bear in mind that dialectical discussion invariably happens in a *place*. Thus, it can be, and in fact, is the case, that in the dialogue dealing with *philia* there is in fact failure to reach a definition (or, put differently, it is an aporetic dialogue), but if we look at what happens in the situation in which the dialogue takes place, we find that *philia* has in fact been realized. I maintain, increasingly strongly, that philosophy is always a matter of *synousia*, a question of a *way of life* in dialogue with the other.

[T. M. Robinson] When I speak of development or evolution of the dialogues, I mean a simple change, not a finality. Plato had a philosophic mind and, naturally, he changed it with the passage of time. I agree with you that every dialogue is a perfect, finished entity, but Plato wrote over a period of 50 years and it can reasonably be expected that he changed some of his views with the passage of time. However, I repeat that I am using the term *change* in a weak sense. Yes, every dialogue is a finished entity, but we must remember that we possess a distance which allows us to have a sight of the whole of Plato's work, and this lets us see with some precision various shifts in perspective that may well have passed unnoticed by Plato himself, being as he possibly was too close to them.

Regarding the second topic, *synousia*, we must remember that philosophy is a lived thing. Socrates and Plato were agreed on a philosophic way of life: dialogical activity with friends. And the Platonic dialogue reflects these discussions. Only friends can participate in a genuine discussion of *philia*. Only just people can engage in genuine discussion of justice. There can be no genuine discussion of virtue if it is not philosophically realized in the virtuous experience and conduct of the interlocutors. The form of the dialogue and the virtue of the soul of the interlocutors influence each other.

[A. BOSCH-VECIANA] We agree, then, on the nature of the *dialogical*, and on a weaker sense of the term 'evolution' as simply 'change'. However, since every work is complete, it does not make sense to search for the possible evolution of concepts or terms outside of the work's context, and focused on some supposed final term of that evolution. *Synousia* is not something terminal: it is that working state, typical of human nature, which wills to live with the specific excellence (*areté*) which dignifies human life. Excellence is realized in the active work of excellence itself. And this work to achieve human excellence requires *time*.

[T. M. ROBINSON] You cannot become a Platonic philosopher simply by reading books. You need to philosophize and to be a good person, and the activity of philosophizing must also involve at least two people. It is not possible to be good while being simply an atomic individual. The virtuous life involves talking with others. Such speech in turn influences virtue. And none of this is possible without the engagement of a minimum of two discussants.

[A. BOSCH-VECIANA] What you say is true, and it is also true that there are a number of ideas and commitments that pervade Plato's works (cf. the text of your paper). There are deep convictions there which form an essential core of dialectic, a core which gives life its sense.

[T. M. ROBINSON] That is indeed the theme of my paper. I think that the convictions in question are constituted in large part by the famous 'maxims' of Socrates (and Plato). Rather than seeing Plato simply as a builder of systems, by contrast with a purely 'dialogical' Socrates, I think that Plato is in fact deeply Socratic in these commitments, which lie at the heart of any system he builds.

[J. SALES] Certainly, the position of Vlastos is unacceptable because it projects weak moral positions as good Socratic moments, and strong metaphysics as bad Platonic moments. This does lead us anywhere.

I think it is more appropriate to deal with the possibility of getting Platonists to try to understand what a Socratic *logos* is, as opposed to other *logoi sokratikoi*. Reducing Plato's writings to various Socratic maxims does not distinguish them from the works of other Socratics, when it is clear that Plato is critically positioning himself against various Socratic schools, such as the Megarians in the *Theaetetus*, the Pythagoreans in the *Phaedo*, or the Cynics in the *Symposium*....

Plato's message is that the examined life is favored by the law of the whole (cf. *Gorgias*). To realize the Socratic command, you cannot break with either the city or the world. This is the strong sense of *synousia*: a law of whole, harmony and friendship. Emphasizing the methodical character of the dialogues leads to a loss of the demand for a law of the whole. Moral philosophy is warranted by what the wise person discovers, i. e., the world, or cosmos (cf. Callicles). If people in the city live in discord something is lost.

So it is not a matter of defining a doctrine, but highlighting the axis by which Plato goes further than other Socratics.

Apart from that, there is a complication in Platonic writing, arising in a quite simple way from the dialogue between two people, and it manifests itself in the compositive juggling of narrative form. The most remarkable evolution, however, is an evolution of literary form in such a way as to direct, a complex topic in itself: wisdom is not achieved *against* the polis or the cosmos.

[T. M. ROBINSON] Vlastos was certainly a great interpreter of Plato, but on the matter of Socrates I think with you that he was in some respects deeply wrong. Plato is profoundly Socratic, not just because of his undying adherence to the famous Socratic maxims, but also because the idea of *harmony* with the other, with the polis, and with the world, never left him. He was a continuation of Socrates in that regard too, a Socrates himself bound by a Greek imperative to live the life of a *polites*.

Plato could of course both agree at times with Socrates and on occasion offer arguments that would distinguish him from the master. But at base each is committed to a search for the optimal situation for the biggest world (the cosmos), the smallest world (the polis), and the microcosmos that is man.

[X. IBÁÑEZ] I really agree with what has been said, and I would like to offer support for Prof. Sales' statements about the law of the whole. I wish to recall, first of all, the *mimetic* character of Platonic dialogues. The Platonic dialogues are fragments of life. The reader does not attend to them by listening to them, but also by watching them. By his use of the dialogical method Plato invites us to attend as spectators, and even to enlarge the conversation. The reader is invited to watch, not only with regard to method, but also with regard to context or situation. Because *the whole cannot be put into words, but mimesis of the whole may be shown*. Plato plays with spaces and times in order to constitute «entireties» for the reader to grasp. Thus, the reader is located in a «divine» position. Let's consider the *Euthyphro,* for instance. In the opening scene, Euthyphro is presented as an innovator in religious matters, able to make predictions. According to him, all his predictions have been accomplished. However, later, just before the conversation about mercy starts, he makes a prediction: he foresees that the trial of Socrates will have a good ending. Obviously, this does not say anything from an intradialogical point of view; but, if we watch it from the outside, from the reader's position, this one prediction makes us understand, *even if the dialogue has not already shown it, nor Socrates already said it*, that this character is a fake, since we, the readers (like Plato when he wrote the dialogue!), already know that the trial of Socrates did not have a good ending. In the *Euthyphro*, Plato plays the role of God (since he entirely dominates the drama which is presented in the dialogue, because he in fact knows how the trial ended) and gives the reader the role of fortune-teller (because we already know how it ended, too). The example is good for illustrating what we have said: by showing us the scene in its entirety, Plato makes us watch what we are listening to in order to understand, as attentive spectators, the sense of all that is being said and all that happens in the light of the complete ensemble of the situation of those who are speaking.

I would like, secondly, to pose two questions. The first: in your paper, it is clear that one of the constants of Platonic teaching is the dialogue form. What do you attribute this to? What is the relation, according to you, of the form of Platonic thought to its content?

And the second: you said that the *Apology of Socrates* presents an atypical case, that it is an exceptional dialogue. I completely agree. My question is: Which dialogue is not exceptional? If I compare them in twos, I cannot find any two dialogues built in the same way: each Platonic dialogue is different from all the others!

[T. M. ROBINSON] I will start with the last question. I entirely agree: all the dialogues are unique in various ways. But I would like to remark that the peculiarity of the *Apology* regards its dialogic nature or, more exactly, its nature as a token representation of a trial. If we look at other places dealing with the immortality of soul (such as the *Phaedo*), I do not think that the Socratic position held in them is the same. The Socrates of the *Apology* is agnostic because, in my opinion, he is there more genuinely Socrates, and in the *Phaedo* he argues in favor of immortality because, it sems to me, he is in that dialogue more representative of Plato's own personal views

As for the other questions: we are more than just spectators. We are invited to participate in the dialogues, all of us, and to involve ourselves in the Platonic method. And the Platonic method in turn involves us in participation in dialogue after the *Socratic* fashion, where one is always taking a 'further step'.

[JOSEP MONSERRAT] Yes, but then we look just like the heroine in the film *The Purple Rose of Cairo*, by Woody Allen. I mean, we can study Plato and involve ourselves in his moralizing and philosophical 'Socratic' dialogues, projecting ourselves onto the scene and the characters, or we can also study Plato himself, and see how he has built the film, which techniques he has used, how has he set up the material, which effects he pursues... More the role of a film-critic. This would also count as an academic approach, would it not ?

[T. M. ROBINSON] You pose an important difficulty. But I want to remind you of what Plato says in *Republic* VII, in the allegory of the cave, where the film was first invented. We can satisfy ourselves by simply watching how the puppet-masters move the pieces which project the shadows; but should we not follow the way of the philosopher, ascending first to the upper world in order to see the things that really are and, afterwards, descending again into the cave? The process presented is fundamentally dialectical, and there is a need of involvement with Plato in a *synousia*, in a philosophical life –engagement throughout the argument and further. We should see the arguments, and get involved with them, in the context of a life like that presented to us by Plato as a Socratic invitation to goodness.

[Xavier Ibáñez] On the question of what you said before about not being simple spectators: When I said Plato invites us to watch I was not saying, of course, that we should be passive spectators. We have to be active, intelligent spectators, people who think about what they see and hear. I think, then, that we agree. What you say about participation, about the «one further step», was implicit in my reference to the *attendance to dialogue*. [Cf. Jordi Sales, «Assistir al diàleg, assistir el diàleg», introduction a J. Monserrat, *El polític de Plató* (1999).]

[Carme Merchán] I understand that you are clearly presenting an approach to philosophy which looks for harmony with the world and the polis. But is this peculiar to Plato? I think we could find the same approach in other philosophers.

[T. M. Robinson] I stressed the matter in the case of Socrates and Plato because thy stand at the very beginning of this deeply Greek idea. Afterwards, obviously, Aristotle, the Stoics, etc., continued the commitment to this ideal.

[A. Bosch] Time points to the end of this meeting. Mr. Robinson, thank you very much for your participation. And thanks to all present for your attendance. We hope T. M. Robinson will come back to Barcelona on one of his frequent trips to our continent.