ANTONIUS ANDREAE
SCOTISM'S BEST SUPPORTING AUCTOR

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1. THE MAKING OF A DOCTOR DULCIFLUUS
ANTONIUS ANDREAE AND HIS POSITION IN
FORMATION OF SCOTISM

The turning of the 13th and 14th century saw the emergence of a bright new star on the firmament of philosophy - the man who reinvented scholasticism after the Condemnation of 1277: John Duns Scotus. The light of his thought soon lit up inspiration in many adepts of the Liberal Arts and the gravity of his doctrine had caught, for some time at least, a number of young thinkers, who later became most influential philosophers of 14th century, like Francis de Mayronis, William of Ockham and Peter Auriol, to name a few. For most of them, however, the contact with the doctrine of the Subtle Doctor was only an inspiring episode early in their careers and it would be difficult to call them advocates of scotism, much less "true" scotists. And still, despite the fact that so many of Scotus' best pupils later turned their backs on his teaching, despite Scotus' early death that had left his work unfinished, the doctrine of John Duns not only survived but started flourishing and gradually became one of the most vital and powerful philosophical schools of later middle ages, whose influence was still felt at the universities even in the 18th century. How was it possible that the ideas so subtle and so sketchy won minds and hearts of so many lovers of wisdom?

Propagation of Scotus' views required devout followers, skilful interpreters and commentators and, last but not least, good thinkers who, accepting the opinions of John Duns for their own, would develop them into a comprehensive doctrine covering the whole spectrum of philosophical inquiry of the time, in a word: transform them into scotism. Such a man was Antonius Andraeae, whom posterity honoured with a telling title Doctor dulcifluus and an even more unambiguous nickname: Scotellus. It is only recently, after years of neglect that we discover how rightly were those names deserved.

The «Little Scot», contrary to his nickname, was born far away from the North Sea coast and almost thousand miles to the south of the river Tweed. Native of Aragon, he spent most of his life in Catalonia; we do not know whether his mother tongue was Spanish or Catalan. His works, however, written in Latin, the then lingua franca of the educated people, had thus become a part of the common heritage of Latin Christendom and were widely read throughout Europe. It is then not merely a funny coinci-
dence that a visitor from the East talks to you about the philosopher from the South, who developed the ideas conceived in the North - this too testifies to the lasting influence of common tradition, in shaping of which Antonius Andreae also had his share. Let me, therefore, offer these few comments on his life and philosophical output as a recognition of his contribution to what is the civilisation of us all.

Very little is known about the life of Antonius Andreae. Only a few fact and dates are certain and so most of the biographical data I am going to present are only conjectures, drawn from scanty remarks in his own works and elsewhere. According to most sources, the future Doctor dulci-fluus was born around 1280 in the little town of Tauste, not far from Zaragoza, in the kingdom of Aragon. It is most likely that he joined the Order of St Francis even before the end of the 13th century, as the canonical age for putting on the habit was 15. We have no knowledge of his noviciate (beside the fact that it must have lasted a year) but it is very likely that soon afterwards he had started his education in the provincial Studium Generale in the city of Lleida. It was a rule that the friars, who were chosen for advanced studies in the studia generalia affiliated at the most important universities of the time, especially in Paris, spent first two to three years learning at the studia of their native provinces. Lleida was by no means a provincial centre of learning; with its new university in the making it must have given a good opportunity for young Antonius to display his intellectual talents. The curriculum in Franciscan studia contained secular subjects, including philosophy of nature and logic; both of them were later to become the Antonius Andreae's principal interests and it is possible that his inclination to them had started just then. It is possible too that his studies there ended with a baccalaureate in Arts.

If the career of Antonius Andreae was similar to that of his future teacher, John Duns Scotus - which is our good guessing, he might continue his philosophical education already in the centre of the academic life of the century - in Paris. At the Parisian Studium Generale Franciscans studied the Liberal Arts for four years: first the trivium (grammar, rhetoric and logic) and then the quadrivium (arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music); those who had already been bachelors of Arts did not need to take the full course and could spend only two years at the Faculty.

Sending a young friar to Paris was a serious matter, requiring due consideration of the provincial chapter. Antonius Andreae must have already been an outstanding student, if his superiors had decided to grant him the honour of studying at Paris. It is probable that the final decision was taken by the then Father General of Friars Minor - Gonsalvus de Balboa, who used to be a professor in Paris and was the mentor of John Duns Scotus. If that was the case, then Antonius' meeting with Scotus was not a mere coincidence. Although no written testimony corroborates such hypothesis, it can be accepted in the light of the documents of the order concerning the edu-

1. S. Garcia Navarro has pointed out that all references to Tauste as the place of birth can be traced back to one source: A. Budinszky, Die Universität Paris und die Fremden an derselben im Mittelalter, Berlin 1876, p. 207-208. Regrettably, Budinszky does not cite any source of his information.

cation of the friars. Thus the first part of Antonius’ life, before his meeting with Scotus, can be systematised as follows: born about 1280, entered noviciate about 1295, studied philosophy in Lleida between 1296 and 1299 and then in Paris from 1300 to 1304, assuming that he took the full course of Arts there, or till 1302, if he had already had the baccalaureate.

1304 is another documented date in the biography of Antonius Andreae. According to Charles Lohr, from 1304 to 1307 Antonius Andreae was a «master in Paris». Of course, it is impossible that he had already been a master of theology at that time; it follows then that he must have been a master of studies at the Franciscan studium there, teaching philosophy to his younger fellow-friars. It is difficult to say whether he had already embraced the teaching of Scotus then; still, such possibility is not excluded, for he might have had contact with Scotus during the latter’s short stay in Paris from 1302 to 1303. There are two more reasons why 1304 is an important date in Antonius’ career. First of all, it was the year of Scotus’ final return to Paris. Soon after his arrival Scotus received doctor’s degree in theology, followed by the title of the Regent Master, which he held from 1306 to 1307, when he was summoned to take the position of Lector principalis at the Franciscan Studium generale in Cologne. There is no doubt that Antonius Andreae attended his lectures, especially that - and this is the second point - he must have started studying theology around that date or before it.

The course of theological studies at Paris required six years: four years for the baccalaureate and two more for master’s degree. Even if we assume that Antonius Andreae had started studying theology in 1303 and went through the course without any interruptions, he would have finished it in 1309. However, the last date attesting to his stay in Paris is 1307; furthermore, we do not find him on the manuscript list of Parisian masters who disputed de goliibet before 1314 (it was not obligatory for masters of theology but most of them did it; moreover, around 1312 we find him already back in Catalonia teaching philosophy of nature - these two facts suggest that his academic career in Paris was broken before he managed to complete his theological studies.

It is still disputed whether he had written his commentary on the Sentences; it is highly probable that he had at least started it. What may be a proof is a tiny opusculum called Compendiosum Principium in IV libros Sententiarum, formerly attributed to St. Bonaventure, which might have formed the preface to that commentary. The weakness of the proof is that the work has not survived in any manuscript copy and, therefore, is difficult date. It might as well be the preface to Antonius’ later work Abbreviatio Operis ooxoniensis Scotti. Putting all the facts together it may be concluded that Antonius education at Paris was cut short most probably by the very same reasons that drove Duns Scotus to Cologne: they were both collateral victims in the struggle between the French King Philip the Fair

and pope Boniface VIII. When staying in Paris could no longer be reconciled with the loyalty to the pope, they had to leave.

Scotus was ordered to go to Cologne, where he died a year later; Antonius Andreae returned to his motherland. By 1312 he had been settled in Catalonia, presumably in the convent of Monzó, the place where he spent most of the rest of his life. The first part of his stay there must have been extremely busy, for it is then that he had composed his most important works: commentaries on the Metaphysics and the Ars Vetus, a collection of early medieval translations and commentaries on Aristotle's logical opuscula, and the Quaestiones ordinariae de tribus principiis naturae. Our knowledge of that is based on a chain of reasoning deduced from two sources. Vázquez Janeiro has discovered a reference to Antonius' logical work: either the quaestiones ordinariae or the commentary on the Ars Vetus in a manuscript dated 1312. On the other hand, in the commentary itself we find references to Antonius' earlier works, namely the commentary on the Metaphysics and quaestiones ordinariae in logic and philosophy of nature. The Metaphysics commentary, in turn, contains only references to the questions on natural philosophy, which are beyond any doubt identical with De tribus principiis naturae. Thus we are able to reconstruct the sequence of Antonius Andreae's earlier works as follows: De tribus principiis naturae, Metaphysics commentary, Quaestiones ordinariae de logica, Ars Vetus commentary. I shall comment on them in due order.

The earliest of the group, Quaestiones ordinariae de tribus principiis naturae, is also Antonius' most original work. Its author must have found it valuable, or at least useful, for there is evidence that he had revised it, probably preparing another course in natural philosophy, by adding two more questions to it. The colophon in the Erfurt manuscript of De tribus principiis says: «Istae quaestiones sunt in universo undecimae, quas frater Antonius Andreae determinavit anno quo legit naturalia in Montebono (i.e. Monzó).» Now the funny thing is that the manuscript contains 13 questions. The discrepancy can be explained when looking at the structure of the work. Eleven is the number of questions concerning the three principles; the initial question is devoted to the subject matter of physics and the final one - to the composite. There are other traits: the initial questions functions also separately under the title Quaestio de subiecto totius scientiae naturalis; the final one is always attached to the rest of the work but it is markedly different, since it is the only of them where we find references to Peter Auriol. According to Anneliese Meier Peter had lectured on the principles of nature in Bologna in 1312, so Antonius' question on the composite must be later. Of course, it is difficult to say whether or not the

7. Antonius Andreae, Scriptum super librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis, Venetiis 1480, f. 24va: «De ista materia de magis et minus in formis plura me recolo dixisse in duabus quaestionibus ordinariis.», Scriptum super librum Isagogen Porphyrii, Venetiis 1480, f. 7rb: «Unde super 4 Metaphysicae recolo me aliqualiter illam quaestionem pertractasse.»
8. MS Erfurt, Amplon. F 359.
two questions were added at the same time, still this does not change the fact that the work had been revised.

The next work is the commentary on the *Metaphysics*, Antonius’ longest and probably most influential piece. Ironically, it has survived in extenso probably in one or two manuscripts only. Already in the 14th century, probably still in Antonius’ lifetime, it was divided into two: the *expositio litteralis* and the *quaestiones*. The latter had become immensely popular: today there are over 40 manuscripts of it scattered around Europe; the former has not survived separately in any manuscripts but there are early printed editions of it. The structure of the work is quite complex: questions of various length are embedded in the commentary *ad litteram*, they are supposed to discuss and explain certain problems arising from the analysis of Aristotle’s text. The commentary is preceded by a long preface and an introductory question concerning the subject-matter of metaphysics. The whole work is started with a quotation from the Ecclesiastes: «Gyrum coeli circuivi sola...». Antonius must have found that structure very suitable for the purpose of presenting his views, for he repeats it in his commentaries to *Ars Vetus*; the quotation is repeated too. Incidentally it was used also in *Compendiosum principio in libros Sententiarum*. His fondness for such a structure makes it possible that the question on the subject-matter of natural philosophy was added to *De tribus principiis* following the example set by the *Metaphysics* commentary. In a way, Antonius was completing what had been started by Scotus: the latter had written on the subject-matter of theology, the former composed similar studies for the remaining theoretical sciences.

The influence of Duns Scotus on Antonius Andreae’s commentary on the *Metaphysics* should not be seen as an inspiration only. Antonius clearly modeled his questions on the ones written by Scotus. Bérubé has shown that many - but not all - of Scotus’ questions were simply reworked and extended by Antonius; the material for those questions of Antonius’ which do not have direct counterpart in Scotus’ work is taken mostly from his *Ordinatio*. Needless to say, there is no doubt that Antonius is the author of the commentary, choosing which subject requires special treatment, which should only be signalled and which can be dropped altogether. Beside giving account of the polemics fought by the Subtle Doctor, Antonius indulges in his own ones, repeatedly taking aim at Peter Auriol, probably his only contemporary he finds worthy of mentioning by name. By the way, this is also true about the *De tribus principiis*, and even more so, as its structure is absolutely original.

The testimony given by the commentary on the *Ars Vetus* points out to one more earlier work of Antonius: the *Quaestiones ordinariae de logica*. The work has long been believed to have been lost. It is possible, however, that it is not lost forever. It may be identical with the *Tractatus de modis distinctionum*, which is preserved in two manuscript copies in Assisi and Padua.13

Since *De tribus principiis naturae* was also frequently called a "tractatus" and the two works have strikingly similar incipits, it is likely that they also have the same author. I have not seen either of the manuscripts yet and therefore I am not able to say anything more precise about it.

Thus we have come to the work which is our main source of information about Antonius Andreae's philosophical output: it is the frequently mentioned above, well known logical work - the commentary on the *Ars Vetus*. It is composed of five separate commentaries to Aristotle's *Categories* and *Hermeneutics*, Porphyrius's *Isagoge*, Boethius's *Divisiones* and the *Liber sex principiorum* ascribed to Gilbert de la Porrée, preceded by a general preface and an introductory question, naturally devoted to the subject-matter of logic. Following the pattern of his *Metaphysics* commentary Antonius gives both literal explanation of the texts discussed and addresses some detailed problems in questions. At the same time, he follows yet another pattern: finishing up what Scotus has begun. As it was the case before, Antonius had the model in three sets of Scotus' quaestiones to the works of Aristotle and Porphyrius. He had reworked their material, added a corresponding literal commentary and written - *ad mentem Scoti* - two more works on the remaining parts of the *Ars Vetus*.

The commentary's importance for a historian lies in the fact that it contains references to so many earlier works of Antonius Andreae. This, in turn, is caused by Antonius' attitude to his works. It is almost certain that he had written them all for didactic purposes - this is attested by information contained in some colophons to the manuscripts of his works, it is also certain that he treated his works as the means of spreading the doctrine of the Subtle Doctor - he admits that himself in a note that shows a rare example of philosophical modesty: "Reader, please pay attention to what you read, because whatever is beneficial in the questions above comes from the doctrine of Scotus, whose steps I followed as closely as I could" (Attendeteigitur lector qui legis, quod siquid benedictum est in quaestionibus supradictis ab arte doctrinarum Scotiae processit, cuius vestigia quantum potui et quantum ipsum capio sum secutus). With those two ends in mind Antonius had to return to some problems again and again. Naturally, they were the most controversial problems. The controversy could be of twofold character: it referred either to the problems Scotus did solve himself in a way that was contrary to the *communis opinio doctorum*, like the problem of the univocal concept of being, or to the contemporary philosophical problems which were not directly addressed or clearly solved by Scotus, like - for instance - the question whether a form, particularly a substantial form, can accept more or less. In the works mentioned above Antonius does not merely repeat the solution he had given to the problems before but tries to discuss the issue from another angle, informing the reader at the same time that he had already addressed them in detail elsewhere.

The last work belonging to the group of what I have called earlier works of Antonius Andreae is the small *opusculum* known under the na-

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Quaestio de subiecto totius logicae. The question is preceded by a short preface in which Antonius says that having completed the commentaries on the Ars Vetus he is going to comment on the remaining books of the Organum, i.e. the so-called Ars Nova. Since the following question discusses the problem whether syllogism is the proper subject of logic, it is clear that it was meant to open a commentary on the Analytics. To the best of our knowledge Antonius did not finish that commentary. It is difficult to explain why he did not. Certainly, it was not broken short by his death, for the introductory part seems to have been written almost immediately after the completion of the earlier work, which - if we are to trust the scant information concerning its dating - was written around 1312, some twenty odd years before Antonius' death. It follows then that he either did not want to complete it or the situation did not permit him to do so. The most likely answer is that something must have happened in his career which rendered his planned commentary redundant.

It may have been moving quarters. Some manuscripts of his works contain remarks that he taught in Lleida. We have no information when he moved there or whether or not he stayed there for the rest of his life, indeed even the order of places in which he lived (Monzó and Lleida) is not quite certain. What we know is that he was there teaching natural philosophy, maybe reading the revised version of his De tribus principiis. Possibly it is also there that he had renewed his interest in theology. Unfortunately, none of the remaining works attributed to Antonius Andreae carries any information which could help a historian in determining later course of his career; to be true, even the authorship of those works is far from certain.

The group of works ascribed to Antonius Andreae, whose attribution is more or less questionable consists of four different pieces. Firstly, there are two theological works: Abbreviatio Operis oxoniensis Scoti and several collections of sermons; for both there are good arguments to accept them as authentic. The other group contains two philosophical works: two sets of questions on Aristotle's De anima and Physics, respectively.

The collections of sermons are preserved in three manuscripts in Assisi. Three of them are found in two manuscripts. In one they are attributed to frater Antonius de Hispania in the other - to Antonius de Ylerdia (Lleida); Martí identifies the author with Antonius Andreae, arguing that he was the only Franciscan friar of that name in the custody of Lleida living at that time. The fourth collection is anonymous, yet its title, Sermones de mortuis, and the incipit are identical with the ones mentioned by Wadding as the works of Antonius Andreae. As I have not seen the questions I cannot offer any comment concerning those attributions. Definitely, it would be interesting to see if they contain any Scotistic traits.

Unlike the sermons, which have remained in obscurity until our times, the Abbreviatio Operis Oxoniensis Scoti is a work of certain reputation. With nine manuscript copies preserved and four printed editions, the most

recent being 1628, it is the third most popular work of Antonius Andreae (after the *Metaphysics* questions and *De tribus principiis naturae*).\(^\text{18}\) Still, of the nine manuscripts only one bears the name of Antonius, six call the author *Scotulus*, and the remaining two attribute the authorship to other people. Of course, *Scotulus* almost certainly refers to Antonius Andreae, who shared that nickname with another Franciscan, Petrus de Aquila, yet the absence of the full name is a little puzzling. A closer look at the *Abbreviatio* gives some more evidence for the authorship of Antonius - in several places in the work one can find remarks like: «Haecest solution addita Antonii Andreae»;\(^\text{19}\) undoubtedly they are incorporated marginal comments showing scotistic erudition of the scribe and at the same time testifying to the true authorship of the work. Another important trait are the references to and polemics with Peter Auriol, Antonius’ favourite polemicist. Again, as in other works of Antonius, he is almost the only 14th century philosopher mentioned explicitly throughout the whole work. Finally, there is a long tradition accepting the authorship of Antonius, even though doubt was as much persistent. Sbaraglia, who gives an account of various opinions concerning it (himself remaining sceptical) claims that it must have been written after 1320,\(^\text{20}\) which makes Antonius’ authorship at least possible, since it is assumed from a remark in the *explicit* of a Pamplona manuscript of his works that he died in 1333 or shortly before it.\(^\text{21}\)

What is interesting about *Abbreviatio Operis oxoniensis* is the reasons of its popularity. After all, it is a work which in its very title is not promising anything one would not find elsewhere, i.e. in Scotus himself. On the other hand, one could well ask the same question about the earlier works of Antonius - I believe the answer would be similar. Antonius clearly writes his works for students and this is almost manifest in *Abbreviatio*. Contrary to the title he does not only summarise Scotus; he clears the matters up eliminating redundant and parallel arguments but also commenting on the solutions and giving lengthy explanations of the problems he himself finds difficult or interesting, all the time trying to systematise the terminology. At the same time, he is at the watch over the purity of the doctrine of the Subtle Doctor. He sees to it that the reader were informed which of the opinions presented are Scotus’ own and which are not. Moreover, the views which do not meet the standards of doctrinal orthodoxy are duly argued against. Finally, the work seems to bear yet another characteristics of Antonius: it is possible to notice certain preference for the philosophical - the problems which refer to metaphysics or natural philosophy receive markedly more attention than the strictly theological ones.

Those very characteristics were probably the reasons for attributing to Antonius the authorship of two other works: *Quaestiones in libros de anima* and *Quaestiones in libros Physicorum*. The first of the two is relatively

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well known. It survived in 15 manuscript copies and Wadding edited it as a work of Scotus in the third volume of his Opera omnia. Lohr claims that Quaestiones in libros de anima might have actually been started by Duns Scotus himself and Antonius could have completed it. Berube suggests that the final form of the work can be ascribed to Jacobus de Turbio. In any case, even if Antonius had any role in the completion of De anima questions, it was the role of an editor, at best, and therefore being unable to discern the contributions of each of the philosophers within the text we are not able to say much of Antonius Andreae’s interpretation of Scotus’ theory of intellect.

The Quaestiones in libros Physicorum is a work shrouded in mystery. Existing in a single, early 15th century English manuscript in Cambridge it is not even directly ascribed to Antonius Andreae. Only the table of contents of the codex (which also contains Antonius’ Metaphysics questions), prepared after binding it, most probably at the same time it was written or somewhat later, mentions the name of Antonius as the author of both works. A closer analysis of the Quaestiones shows that it is indeed a work belonging to the scotist school. Moreover, at least some parts of it bear striking resemblance to Antonius’ De tribus principiis naturae, several questions being clearly modelled on it. Furthermore, it contains some discussions with Peter Auriol, Antonius favourite polemicist. Still, doubts remain. Antonius Andreae habitually referred to his earlier works when discussing matters he had been dealing with before. Here, there are no such references and his name is conspicuously absent. This is puzzling, if we bear in mind that some passages of the Quaestiones are rewritten form De tribus principiis almost word for word. The argument that Abbreviatio Operis oxoniensis contains no references of that sort either cannot be accepted, since Abbreviatio has a totally different character. Therefore it may be concluded that Quaestiones in libros Physicorum is a work of a later scotist, possibly an Englishman, who had very good knowledge of both Scotus and Antonius Andreae, whose views he accepted as his own.

As it has been already said, even the mistaken attribution tells us something about what the contemporaries and posterity thought of Antonius Andreae. First of all, he was associated with the true teaching of John Duns Scotus. It can be said that Antonius succeeded in persuading the philosophical public that his work was nothing but a continuation of what the Subtle Doctor had started. That continuation was meant to proceed in a double way: on one hand Antonius’ works were supposed to popularise the teaching of Scotus in those issues Scotus had already discussed himself by presenting a clearer but still comprehensive and trustworthy exposition of his doctrine - that was what Antonius did in the Metaphysics commentary and especially in the Abbreviatio Operis oxoniensis; on the other hand Antonius tried to extend the doctrine of Scotus onto the disciplines his master had not managed to put under scrutiny - here Antonius introduced

Scotism into the philosophy of nature with his *De tribus principiis naturae*, extended it in the study of logic with his commentaries on the *Ars Vetus*, and probably in moral philosophy - with his sermons. The ways were complementary to one another and - as we have seen - Antonius took great pains to move ahead without losing contact with Scotus, his doctrine and concepts he tried to explain and use in a systematic way.

In both ways Antonius Andreae achieved a success. Despite the fact that he wrote almost all of his works in a place which was situated far away from the centres of learning of his times many of his works became - *toutes proportions gardees* - philosophical best-sellers of the 14th and, especially, 15th century Latin Europe, penetrating to the remotest outposts of Western civilisation. Part of the success can be, of course, attributed to the circumstances: it was the time when the dominance of philosophical schools was being established and Antonius Andreae was instrumental in doing that for scotism; moreover, his religious order - the Franciscans - was one of the most operative intellectual corporations of the time and the teaching which won approval of the chapter was quickly spread through the network of Franciscan *Studia Generalia*. Here I could offer a digression concerning Poland: because both Polish province of the Franciscans and the provincial *studium* were set up relatively late - only in the second part of the 15th century - scotism had not arrived in Poland until more or less that time. But when it did arrive it was taught from the manuals by Antonius Andreae.25

One could remark here, however, that Antonius later demise was rooted in his success. The more closely he followed the teaching of the Subtle Doctor the more likely was the posterity to take his works for Scotus' own, first accepting them as valuable doctrine, later rejecting it as a work of a «dunce». Antonius popularity, judged by the number of printed editions of his works, reached its peak around the turning of the 15th and 16th century. The decline of scholastics, receding under the pressure of humanism from one side and Reformation from the other, was gradually eroding interest in Antonius Andreae's works. In the fifty years, 1475-1525, there were over forty editions of his various writings, the remaining three quarters of the 16th century bring only four editions and in all four cases it is the *Abbreviatio Operis oxoniensis*. Antonius remains interesting only as a commentator of Scotus. Even the return of scholasticism started with the counter-reformation does not revert the trend: the monumental edition of Scotus' *Opera omnia* published by Wadding in 1639 sporadically mentions the name of Antonius and his *Expositio litteralis in Metaphysicam* (part of the *Metaphysics commentary*) is published there under the name of Scotus. Finally, Enlightenment draws the curtain of neglect over the then *Doctor dulcifluus* for more than a hundred years.

Antonius Andreae was not forgotten entirely. In 19th century his name appears in the works of authors writing about the history of the Franciscans, like Sbaraglia, or about Catholic theology, like Hurter. However, it is only in the end of the century that we can see the beginning of research concerning the teaching of Scotus and scotism in general, following

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the wave of interest in scholasticism, originated by pope Leo XIII with his famous dictum: «Ite ad Thomam!». The research in scotism gained momentum with the establishment of the Scotistic Commission in Quaracchi in 1927. Its first director, father Longpré, was also the author of several papers concerning Antonius Andreeae; still the interest in Antonius was only secondary. The most important date for the modern study of Antonius is 1929. It was the year when Martí de Barcelona published the paper *Fr. Antoni Andreu O.M., doctor dulcisflus*, which was the first monograph of Antonius Andreeae. His research was carried on, both in Spain - by brothers Carreras y Artau and later by Vázquez Janeiro - and abroad, particularly by Bérubé. It was him, who finally recognised the importance of Antonius Andreeae for the formation of scotism as a philosophical school, calling him «the second founder of scotism». In the light of this the papers I am presenting here are nothing but a set of examples to that comment.
When John Duns Scotus, Master of Studies at the Franciscan Studium Generale was dying in Cologne on 8 November 1308 his name had already been known throughout Europe, not only within his own order, which was soon to accept his teaching as its approved, though unofficial, doctrine (alongside the teaching of Alexander of Hales and St. Bonaventure) but also outside it, at the growing number of universities, where the works of the Subtle Doctor were read and discussed, both critically and apologetically. Duns Scotus was becoming rapidly popular and his ideas were winning a following comparable to that of the great figures of 13th century philosophy and theology: Thomas Aquinas and Albert the Great.¹ There was, however, a marked difference between the heritage of those two thinkers and that of Duns Scotus: they left behind imposing number of works their followers could always consult when searching for a particular solution, whereas Scotus’s premature death left his followers with but a sketch of a doctrine, drawn first of all in his Sentences commentary, but also in his earlier works, like the questions on Metaphysics and Categories and treated in a more detailed and systematic way only in the few later ones: Quodlibets, De primo principio and Theoremata. Had he lived longer, he would have undoubtedly tried to address more problems belonging to various disciplines of philosophy. His early demise left his disciples with a daunting task of bringing in the Scotist spirit where their master had failed to enter.

One of the disciplines John Duns Scotus had never specifically discussed was philosophy of nature. As it is one of the fundamental parts of philosophy, it could not remain neglected if Scotism were to become a comprehensive philosophical view on a par with the existing ones. The «empty spaces» had to be filled in somehow. The task was not impossible: some of the existing works of Scotus contained passages referring to physical problems in a more or less general way, some issues were discussed on the side of theological or metaphysical disputes, still other passages could yield «physical» conclusions after a more detailed analysis. The first man who set to the work of putting together the scattered theses and presenting them in a coherent way was Scotus’s own pupil, Antonius Andreae. His aim was to give a systematic presentation of the philosophy of nature according to the intention of Scotus (ad mentem Scotti) and referring to his own words as often as possible. He decided to organise the material in the

popular form of questions, which he presented publicly as _quaestiones ordinariae_ at least once, when teaching natural philosophy at the Franciscan convent in Monzó; there is some evidence that he may have read them again in Lleida,\(^2\) where he probably supplemented the work with two more questions to serve as introduction and epilogue to the whole. It is almost certain that those questions formed the body of his well-known work, _De tribus principiis naturae_.

The title of the work, in full: _De tribus principiis rerum naturalium: materia forma et privatio_, is not very original; on the contrary, it seems to be modelled on the title of a work by St. Thomas Aquinas, _De principiis naturae_, written some 60 years earlier. The subject itself was quite popular: at the same time Antonius Andreae was reading his questions at Monzó his fellow-Franciscan and possibly also a university colleague from Paris, Peter Auriol, was discussing the same subject in Bologna.\(^3\) Antonius was clearly not going to set a new pattern of presenting the doctrine concerning natural beings but to fill an existing form with the Scotist content. Accordingly, he decided to include in his work all the topics which were raised by Scotus in the more «physical» questions of his _Quaestiones subtilissimae in Metaphysicam and Ordinatio_ - of the total number of 11 questions of the main part of _De tribus principiis naturae_, five have titles modelled after questions from Scotus’ _Metaphysics_ and two - after questions from _Ordinatio_. The remaining ones are products of his own invention but they too contain material coming from the two works of Scotus. The choice of the form might have been caused by the requirements of the curriculum, which demanded a standard lecture course in natural philosophy, presented in the form of _quaestiones ordinariae_, questions in a particular subject, for instance on the three principles of nature: _De tribus principiis naturae_. Assuming that Antonius’ _De tribus principiis_ is identical with his _quaestiones ordinariae_ in natural philosophy, it is the first surviving textbook of Scotist philosophy of nature intentionally written for that purpose.

Despite the title, his work is divided into five parts, the middle three being devoted to the principles in question. Most of the work, i.e. ten questions out of the total number of 13 is devoted to the problems concerning matter and form, each being discussed in five respective questions. Of the remaining three questions, one - immediately following the first two parts - deals with privation, the third announced principle; it is followed in turn by the final question, which, in a sense, brings together all the main issues analysed in _De tribus principiis naturae_ taking up the subject of the composite as the end of the process of generation. The third «loose» question precedes the whole body of the work and serves as an introduction of sorts, discussing the problem of the subject-matter of natural philosophy. Altogether, the work forms a wonderfully consistent unity, its structure showing signs of careful planning and its content being presented in a clear, almost elegant way. The exquisite form of the work is a strong argu-
ment in support of the opinion that *De tribus principiis* as we know it is a work which must have been written in full by the author himself. This supposition is strengthened by the fact that there are some other works by Antonius, e.g. his Aristotle commentaries, that are known to be *scripta*, i.e. works written by the author himself (to be distinguished from *reportationes*, i.e. students’ notes from lectures and disputes or *ordinationes*, i.e. notes edited by the author). Such a form could suggest that he had found his questions important. We know at least that he himself found *De tribus principiis* important enough to refer to it several times in many of his other works,4 where he sometimes only summarises the determination he had given to the problem before. Giving his text a definitive and clear form, more suitable and hence more attractive for the reader, Antonius no doubt helped spread the Scotist “physical” ideas it contained much better, quicker and farther than any other disciple of the Subtle Doctor.

The scope of the influence of *De tribus principiis* is in a way reflected by the fact that its copies are almost ubiquitous. The 16 manuscripts of Antonius’ manual which have survived to our times are almost evenly distributed among the old libraries of Europe: from Spain to Poland and from Italy to Scotland.5 What is more, the text of the work was rewritten not merely for didactic purposes at Franciscan *studia*; it was also treated as an interesting presentation of Scotist philosophy of nature and depending on the reader’s attitude to the doctrine of the Subtle Doctor it provided either arguments of authority or arguments for polemics. I shall try to show here instances of both attitudes. First, however, let me give you an insight into the work, the problems it discusses and the way it presents and interprets the teaching of Scotus.

The first problem Antonius Andreae takes on in *De tribus principiis* is, appropriately, the problem of the subject matter of physics, i.e. natural philosophy. The title of the initial question asks: “Utrum mobilitas sit formalis ratio subjectiva primi subjecti philosophiae naturalis”, i.e. whether mobility is the formal characteristic of the first subject of natural philosophy. Before presenting his conclusions concerning the problem Antonius first discusses the problem of mobility and motion itself and then the necessary characteristics of the first subject of a science. Those introductory discussions serve to explain the title of the question.

In the first place, Antonius presents a twofold division of the concept of mobility. According to him it can be viewed either as an ability or as an actual reality. The former aspect shows mobility merely as a potential for change. As such mobility is formally a relation (*respectus*) of its object to a certain end. That means that though mobility is formally and essentially different from its subject, i.e. a physical object, it remains really identical with it, i.e. not a different thing. It is in this aspect that mobility is the proper attribute of the first subject of natural philosophy, i.e. the quality which serves as a criterion for accepting anything as an object of physics. Antonius explains his statement in the following way: If we accept mobility as the proper attribute of the first subject of physics, then whatever is

included in the consideration of the science must be either moved or, at least, apt to be moved; this being true *immobilia* are not within the scope of interests of natural philosophy, which is really the case. The latter aspect refers to mobility as actual motion. For Antonius the concept of motion can be characterised as follows. First of all, motion is formally neither a relative nor an absolute, since motion towards a substance, quality, or quantity is an absolute but motion towards a place is relative. Secondly, motion is separable from its object, which can also be considered in rest; thus it is different from the object both really and formally. For those reasons motion cannot be the proper attribute of the subject of natural philosophy.\(^6\)

The other part of the introductory section is concerned with characteristics of the first subject of a science (not specifically physics). Antonius sets several conditions which must be met by such a subject. In the first place, it must possess a quidditative concept, which would not be included in anything earlier referring to that science, otherwise it would be neither subject nor first. Furthermore, the quidditative concept must belong to the first subject formally and absolutely, because cognition refers to the form and because the relative presupposes the absolute. Finally, the first subject must be adequate to its science, because everything in a science has attribution to its first subject in one way or another.\(^7\)

The *corpus* of the initial question contains discussion of a list of propositions divided into negative and affirmative ones. In the first part Antonius refutes the opinions of other philosophers, the second part presents his own, Scotist opinion. He starts with disproving the Thomist opinion that being (*ens*) in whatever consideration can be the subject of natural philosophy, because otherwise physics would be subordinate to metaphysics, as they would share the same subject. The second refuted opinion is that of Aristotle: Antonius states that the claim that body (*corpus*) is the subject of physics is false, since the science, whose principal interest is in mobile objects, refers to incorporeal mobile objects, e.g. angels, too. The third proposition to be disproved claims that mobility is the formal, subjective characteristic of the first subject of natural philosophy. Antonius rejects it arguing that as a relative mobility cannot be formal characteristic of the subject of physics, since it cannot give the science the unity, which can be drawn only from something absolute. Moreover, being a proper attribute of the first subject of physics mobility cannot be its formal characteristics, since the latter is prior to the former. The final solution is brought by affirmative conclusions, which come close to the end of the question, as they are followed only by short answers to the principal arguments. Antonius Andreae states there that the first subject of natural philosophy is substance the formal characteristics of which is naturality.\(^8\)

Although Antonius Andreae confesses that the opinions he presents in *De tribus principiis rerum naturalium* are inspired by Duns Scotus, he never mentions explicitly the immediate source he draws them from. It can be shown, however, that the inspiration came from two sources: Scotus’


\(^7\) *Ibidem*, f. 1vb-2ra.

\(^8\) *Ibidem*, f. 2rb-4ra.
question on the subject-matter of theology from his Sentences commentary (Prologue, part III, question 3) provided both model and the set of conditions Antonius readily makes use of and the questions from the sixth book of his Quaestiones subtilissimae in libros Metaphysicae gave Antonius some clues concerning the actual content of the first subject of natural philosophy and its formal characteristics and the characteristics of mobility. Both sources are extensively though somewhat latently cited by Antonius throughout his work.9

Having established natural substance as the subject-matter of natural philosophy Antonius goes on to discuss its constitutive principles. The first part of De tribus principiis is devoted to matter and the five questions it comprises deal with several problems characteristic for physical considerations of the time: whether matter has a positive being independently from form, whether it can exist without a form, whether it can be generated and corrupted, whether matter subject to quantity has extension different from the extension of quantity and whether matter is something that is essentially contained in the concept of quiddity. It can be seen that Antonius’ scope of interest here is formed alongside the issues which in the 13th and 14th century were subjects of debate between the Aristotelian standpoint of Thomas Aquinas and his followers, the more traditional point of view, characteristic for the Franciscan school and the opinions of Duns Scotus, who tried finding the «middle road» between the two. It could also be said that many of those questions might rather be classified as metaphysical, not physical; still their subject-matter is material, hence natural, substance and this alone seems to be enough for Antonius to treat them as pertaining to philosophy of nature.

Pondering over the ontological status of matter Antonius Andreae states that contrary to many philosophers who denied it any positive being and maintained that its being was merely privative, i.e. that it was a pure potency, matter has a positive being. Antonius argues that it is clearly visible, since matter is one of the constitutive parts of the composite, whereas something which would only be a privation could not be a part of anything. It follows, therefore, that both form and matter are positive principles, really different from one another, like two different «things». As such, each of them is intelligible independently of the other not only by God but also by men. The latter, however, cannot have the intellection of matter or form separately in statu isto, i.e. in mortal life, since what is the object of human intellect in this life is not being as such but quiddity of material things.10

Accepting matter as a positive, independent reality leads Antonius Andreae to a conclusion that it possesses its own entitative act, prior to the act given to it by form. Naturally, this act does not eliminate the potential character of matter with respect to the form; still it distinguishes the potency of matter from the potency of an accident. The former is the so-called «subjective potency», i.e. it is a substrate for any form which may co-

me to it and it remains the same «thing» both in the beginning and in the end of the processes of generation and corruption; by contrast, the latter potency is pure absence of certain quality which comes with the form. Thus the proper act of matter is that which constitutes it as a being in «subjective potency».

Positive being and its own act already constitute matter as something. Such a point of view is not extraordinary in the times of Antonius Andreae, for we can find it not only in Scotus, who is the most immediate source of the theses presented in De tribus principiis naturae, but also in Henry of Ghent. However, what for Henry was a theological issue which could hardly be solved by philosophical means, for Antonius is a legitimate physical problem, the solution of which had already been given by the Subtle Doctor. He claims: «Est conclusio Scoti, quod materia sine aliqua contradicione potest per se existere sine quacumque forma substantiali sive accidentalis, vel absoluta vel respectiva». In the polemics Antonius discusses an interesting objection raising the problem that matter existing without any form would be unlimited and thus form an infinite body - something impossible and contradictory according to Aristotelian physics. Antonius replies that matter is unlimited only in a positive way, i.e. it has no external limits of itself which could give it a definite shape, still it is limited in a negative way, i.e. it is not infinite in its internal division. Therefore, God can create a body without any form but not an infinite body.

Antonius notes that the discussions concerning material beings imply the problem of bodiness and, consequently, extension. According to him, matter has no extension of itself, when it is considered without the later determinations given to the composite by categories. However, even when matter is subject to the category of quantity, its extension is different from the extension of quantity, because matter receives its extension the moment it is united with form to constitute a body, which is to say: before any accidental determination (including the accident of quantity). Antonius concludes that such extension of matter must be its characteristic feature, not different from it really. It must also be potential and it becomes actualised only by extension superadded to it by the accidental form of quantity.

Antonius Andreae’s analyses pertaining to matter in the processes of generation and corruption are a good example showing how he was refining the issues first dealt with by Duns Scotus. He observes that in the process of corruption - and by a mirror analogy in generation, too - there is a resolution of forms down to the prime matter. This process is different in different beings, for in the ones, which have one form only, it occurs instantaneously but in the ones, which have more forms, which is to say: in all living material beings, it has certain duration, since even after the destruction of the ultimate form there remains the form of bodiness. The

form of bodiness is an incomplete one (it has no species of its own) and it is in continuous flux towards the prime matter, in which the other forms subordinate to it are eliminated. This description, accounting for the process of decay provides a detailed explanation for doubts concerning the Scotist doctrine of plurality of forms at the same time giving a good solution to the difficulties raised by the competing doctrine of unity of the substantial form upheld by Thomas Aquinas and his followers.¹⁵

The last of the questions concerning matter takes up the problem analysed by natural philosophers since the times of Aristotle: if material beings - unlike the immaterial ones - are composed of form and matter this must be somehow accounted for by their essences. Antonius’ answer is no different from the ones given by the communis opinio doctorum, stating that matter indeed pertains to the quiddity of material beings, but what it interesting about it is the elegant network of distinctions he presents on the way. He says that in things composed of matter and form both one and the other can be viewed in a number of ways. In the first place, both form and matter can be treated as integral parts of a composite, i.e. an individual substance, in the simplest, Aristotelian sense of the words. Secondly, they can be analysed in reference to quiddity (essence). Here, the form is referred to either as forma totius, the form of the whole, whose appropriate matter can only be that which makes it individual, i.e. haecceity (n.b. Antonius does not use this term in De tribus principis nature preferring the circumlocutive proprietas individualis), or it is referred to as forma partis or partial form, whose appropriate counterpart is matter conceived of in an absolute way as the potential principle of being. Finally, form as referring to essence can be treated as an abstract and then its material counterpart is simply an individual, since individuals are the matter of species. In those distinctions we can see Antonius the textbook writer at his best. He conveniently categorises the new concepts introduced by Duns Scotus (in this case - haecceity) and puts them within the framework of existing, well established terms in order to facilitate the understanding of the problem. He is even not afraid of attaching the dubious label of «matter» to the principle of individuation, as long as he knows he is not sailing away from the meaning given to it by the Subtle Doctor.¹⁶

The other of the two main parts of the work, which concerns form (for, as it has been said, privation receives somewhat less attention) contains five questions dealing with similarly important problems of the 14th century natural philosophy: the existence of rationes seminales in matter, the existence of measure for forms generated naturally, the problem whether substantial forms are distinguished as mutually contradictory, whether there is plurality of substantial forms in natural substances and whether grade can be found in quiddities of accidental forms. In the question about rationes seminales Antonius looks back to a problem well established in the tradition of Augustinian philosophy. It was his teacher, Duns Scotus who departed form that tradition, which until then had been shared by most Franciscan masters, St. Bonaventure included. Antonius Andreae, remaining a faithful disciple upholds the position of his master, providing

ample arguments for it. He shows that if one accepts the before presented doctrine of matter as a positive principle of natural things, there is no need to introduce anything that would have to play the role of active principle, «stimulating» matter to receive a form. Matter with its own act of being in subjective potency is of itself ready to accept forms and thus ratio seminalis is a concept suitable only in more particular considerations of the problem animal generation, impregnation and conception.17

Of the remaining four questions concerning form three constitute a distinct unity, centred around the problem grades of forms and their comparability. The subject has become exceedingly popular in the 14th century and it can be treated as a sign of growing disappointment with Aristotelian qualitative physics and an anticipation of the new, quantitative approach. Admittedly, Antonius Andreae is no revolutionary here but his stress on the successive character of the processes of generation and corruption, seen as assumption or removal of form, respectively, measured against the flow of time, already possesses some resemblance to modern presentation of the concept of change and motion.

Naturally, a closer look on Antonius conception show fundamental differences between his Scotist perspective and that of the modern physics. His doctrine remains strongly attached to Aristotelian concepts and presumptions. In generation, change is a gradual process but occurring between opposing extremes. Moreover, it is gradual only with respect to creatures consisting of more than one substantial form, thus allowing their successive assumption; therefore beings informed by are single form must be generated instantaneously (in accordance with the opinions of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas). Finally, as long as it refers to assumption of successive forms and their perfectional portions, it is not continuous.

The best example Antonius Andreae presents to illustrate the process of substantial change as one occurring between opposing extremes is that of the transmutation of elements. Because the forms of elements are in opposition (though not contradictory), they are apt to undergo successive changes from one to another by means of intension and remission of their essential properties: calidity, frigidity, humidity and dryness. The necessary condition for those changes is possessing one and the same matter, which is the substrate in which those processes take place. This excludes the possibility of gradual change in immaterial beings but does not rule it out in material substances. Indeed, Antonius admits successive change in substantial forms and accordingly he must accept that in the process of substantial generation it is possible to notice certain grades, which makes him finally concede that though something cannot be «more» or «less» substance it is still possible to distinguish between «more» or «less noble» grades of such form.18

Antonius' solution of the problem is all the more interesting when we note that he ventures to give a clear and definite solution to the problem Duns Scotus answered in a particularly obscure way, which made his editor and commentator Lucas Wadding observe: «vix aut ne vix quidem capi potest». A. Maier claims that close analysis of various comments of Duns

Scotus, contained mostly but not exclusively in his *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*, on the problem of remission and intension in substantial and elementary forms shows that the Subtle Doctor did not actually accept the possibility that such forms can possess grades and remained within the framework of Aristotelian - Thomist way of thinking about it. She adds that Antonius' position on the issue is clearly influenced by Averroism. Averroistic influence or not, the concept of grade in substantial and elementary forms is a clever solution, providing good explanation for problems of individuation, change and transmutation in a similar way it offered solution to the problem of motion with respect to accidental forms. With his solution, but only there, Antonius seems to overcome the traditional separate treatment of substances and accidents.\(^\text{19}\)

Plurality of substantial forms is the issue which is frequently mentioned in earlier questions of *De tribus principiis naturae* but Antonius Andreae devotes it a separate question in order to present and defend the Scotist point of view against the Thomists, whose opinions he duly refutes. The arguments Antonius adduces are all taken from natural philosophy: he claims that since no accident can be present in matter without the mediation of substantial form and one and the same accident remains in the corpse and in the living creature, there must be a substantial form which remains in the body even after the soul, which is the ultimate form, has been separated from it. According to Antonius, who follows Scotus closely here, this argument is valid not only with respect to human beings, as suggested by Henry of Ghent, but to all animate creatures, which besides the ultimate form possess substantial form of bodiness, which is the form of mixture (sc. of elements) appropriate for that kind of creature. Furthermore, even parts of the body can have their separate substantial forms of mixture, since various parts differ in their composition and so it would be impossible for them to be informed by one and the same form. At the same time, Antonius is not afraid that such a plurality of forms shows creatures as aggregates rather than composites - he claims that substantial forms form a hierarchical structure starting from the elementary ones and ending in the ultimate specific forms, the final perfection and unity being given by the individual grade.\(^\text{20}\)

The sole question discussing the problem of the third principle of nature - privation - could well belong to the first part of the treatise, since it seems to be more concerned with matter than with privation itself, analyzing whether privation is identical with potency of matter. The principal question Antonius Andreae raises there is what the potency of matter is like. He states that potency of matter is understood in a double way: either as a fundament or as a relation (*respectus*), the latter being further divided into *respectus aptitudinalis* and *respectus actualis*. Of these three types of potency, the first is not different from matter, either really or formally, the second - is not different really but is different formally, the third - is really different from matter. The three types of potency refer to matter considered in general, separable and inseparable matter, respectively. What he me-


ans by separable or inseparable matter is actually the separability of its po-
tency. Actual potency is separable from matter since it refers to an act, which is external to it; aptitudinal potency is not separable from matter for matter is always apt to receive a form and, therefore, such potency can be separated from matter only formally but not really. The final solution is expectedly concordant with the earlier view of matter as positive principle and rejects the claim of identity of matter and privation on the ground that matter is not altogether identical with potency.21

The final question of De tribus principiis naturae plays the role of an epilogue in which the plots of the story are finally put together before it is over. Antonius Andreea shows the principles of nature in a dynamic perspective, asking whether composite of matter and form is the end of the process of natural generation. He states that the principles of nature can be divided in the following way: matter and form are the two principles of essence of things, form and privation are the two principles of generation of things. He points out that neither form nor matter exist per se but only per accidentes with respect to the composite; similarly, neither form nor privation are generated per se - only the composite. It is because of that - he says - that generation is called natural, as it leads to the coming to being of a natural being. The composite of those principles, emerging from the process of generation, is an act ending the process; at the same time it is an entity really different from the entities of its constitutive parts (as they can continue to exist even after its destruction). The entity of a composite has absolute character, i.e. it exists of itself with no respect to anything else. It is the form of the whole (forma totius) which is identical with quiddity of a thing. It is, therefore, not an individual, for individuality is something which is external to the concept of quiddity and comes to it only as a final act of the form.22

As it can be seen from the brief presentation of the main problems analysed by Antonius Andreea in De tribus principiis naturae the work is an interesting piece of writing. In a compact form it addresses many, if not all, the most important debates in natural philosophy of the time, presenting at the same time consistently (or almost consistently) Scotist solutions. It is small wonder then that it was soon used as a source or a reference book for many scholars interested in Scotist philosophy of nature, even though - as it has been said - most of the opinions presented there can be found directly in the texts of the Subtle Doctor, yet in a much less orderly arrangement, to say the least.

A good example of the early reception of Antonius Andreea’s De tribus principiis naturae is the Quaestiones in libros Physicorum by Theodoricus of Magdeburg, a little known Bolognese Averroist, who later taught in the newly opened university of Erfurt. The Quaestiones might have been written still in Antonius’ lifetime for they are dated before 1347. In several place in their text one can find a handful of remarks concerning Scotist solutions, some of them naming the author of the quoted opinion; in two cases it is the name Antonius, which can be clearly identified to stand for Antonius Andreea. By comparison, the name of Scotus appears

two or three times. Antonius is cited in the first question: "Utrum ens mobile sit hic subjectum" and in the 18th one: "Utrum potentia materiae distinguishatur ab eius essentia"; in the former Antonius views are reported in rationes principales alongside arguments taken from other philosophers, namely Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome, in the latter - Antonius is the only authority quoted in the question (beside Aristotle and Averroes, of course), not in the rationes principales but in the conclusiones, which follow them.

Both instances of citation share the same characteristic feature: Theodoricus looks to Antonius not because he does not know Scotus, for he quotes him elsewhere in his work, but because it is only in Antonius that he can find definitive and ready answers to the very problems he discusses in his questions. Neither the problem of the subject-matter of physics nor that of the relation between matter and its potency is directly addressed in Scotus; Antonius, on the contrary, devotes a whole question to each. In neither of the questions does Theodoricus accept Antonius position, in neither, however, are they outright rejected, either.

The work which treats De tribus principiis naturae as an unquestionable source is another commentary on the Physics, which used to be attributed to Antonius Andreae himself. The work, which has been preserved in one manuscript copy only (in the library of Gonville & Caius College in Cambridge), comes most probably from the turning of 14th and 15 centuries and beyond any doubt is a product of Scotist school, possibly the Franciscan Studium Generale in Cambridge. The commentary is an interesting work, since it incorporates large fragments of the text of De tribus principiis into a broader and more comprehensive study of Aristotle's Physics. However, the author does not make any mention of the fact that some sections, or indeed whole questions sometimes, are taken from the work by Antonius Andreae; on the contrary, they are treated as integral parts of the work. The "striking similarity" to De tribus principiis nature resulting from it was probably the reason why the Physics commentary was ascribed to Antonius.

It does not seem to be a coincidence that the question which makes probably the most liberal use of the material from De tribus principiis naturae is the initial question, devoted to the subject matter of natural philosophy. Although the author formulates the title of the question a little different from Antonius and, accordingly, rearranges the material in a little different way, supplementing it with a handful of theses of other Franciscan masters: Duns Scotus, Francis of Marchia and Peter Auriol, the core of the question repeats almost literally the arguments and conclusions presented by Antonius Andreae. Again, it can be seen that Antonius becomes an authority, for fellow Scotists at least, in those issues in which he is creatively developing the ideas of Scotus, "filling in" those spaces, which the Subtle Doctor would not or could not address himself.


Such an approach of Antonius and to Antonius paved the way for his *De tribus principiis naturae* to the libraries and curricula of Franciscan *Studia Generalia* around Europe. The two examples presented before suggest good knowledge of *De tribus principiis* in Italy and in England already in the 14th century. The interest in the work does not fade throughout the next century: an early 15th century manuscript of *De tribus principiis* preserved in the *Bibliotheca Amploniana* in Erfurt (a name already invoked here, too) contains information that the work was copied in Cambridge by a German Franciscan, Helmhold von Arendorp, who later taught in Erfurt.\(^{25}\) Erfurt, in turn, was a university with close relations to Prague. This might explain how the copies of *De tribus principiis* appeared there. The interest in the work in Prague must have been considerable, for it is the only place beside Rome where it has survived in more than one copy. Actually, of the 16 copies known to exist nowadays, four are in Rome and three in Prague.\(^{26}\)

Poland, too, recognised the value of Antonius Andreae’s treatise as a reliable manual of Scotist philosophy of nature, even though the influence of Scotism in Poland was limited, mostly because it appeared there very late - only in the end of the 15th century. It is interesting that the first remarks concerning *De tribus principiis naturae* in the works of masters of the Kraków university appear in the polemical arguments of the opponents of Scotism: Johannes de Glogovia and Jacobus de Gostynin, both authors of commentaries on the *Physics*. However, polemics with Antonius Andreae can be found in the works of Polish Scotists, too: Nicolas Twaróg of Biestrzyków and Johannes of Stobnica criticise Antonius for the solution he gives to the problem of ...the subject-matter of natural philosophy.\(^{27}\) In the end, therefore, it can be said that the success of *De tribus principiis naturae* by Antonius Andreae was not merely a reflection of the success of Scotism. It was, and in some way still is, the success of a brilliant piece of philosophical writing, rightly earning for its author the title of *Doctor dulcisfluus* - the Sweet-spoken Doctor.

