The War of the Spanish Succession in the Catalan-speaking Lands

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ABSTRACT

The War of the Spanish Succession affected the entire continent of Europe directly or indirectly. Within the Spanish monarchy, most of the states in the Crown of Aragon sided with Archduke Charles of Austria (Charles III), while Crown of Castile lent its support to Duke Philip of Anjou (Philip V). After the Treaty of Utrecht, Catalonia prolonged its resistance for 14 more months under a republican government. At the end of the war, the victors imposed repression, exile and the end to the Catalan constitutions.

KEY WORDS: War of the Spanish Succession, Austriacism, pactism, absolutism, history of Catalonia, 18th century

The history of the Catalan-speaking lands (and the Kingdom of Aragon) singles out the end of the War of the Spanish Succession as a true turning point. Prior to the war, the kingdoms within the Crown of Aragon had developed their own legislation and political life. This process was not halted with either the merger of the crowns which dynastically linked Aragon and Castile in the late 15th century or the formation of the composite Habsburg monarchy. Quite the contrary, throughout the 16th and 17th centuries the different states within the Crown of Aragon underwent institutional development characterised by the extension of social and territorial representation and an increase in the competences and fiscal resources of their representative or parliamentary institutions. In parallel, especially starting in the last few decades of the 16th century, these institutions forged their own legal-political discourse, a process that was particularly intense in Catalonia. However, this tendency suddenly ground to a halt with Catalonia’s defeat in the War of the Spanish Succession. The new Bourbon order, cemented with the Nueva Planta decrees, led to the imposition of a newly-minted absolutist regime. In this article, we shall analyse the Catalan-speaking lands’ involvement in the Spanish War of Succession, focusing especially on the factors that led to their engagement in war and the consequences brought about by their defeat.
ments, rulers and even the monarchy itself had to submit; and as a rather original feature of the country, control over the revenues and expenditures of the state taxation authority by the representative institutions of the branches or institutions (and notably by the General Deputation, or Generalitat de Catalunya). Only a full awareness of the Generalitat’s political and fiscal power enables us to grasp the key role played by this institution in the revolutionary events of 1640, 1705 and 1713.

For its part, the Kingdom of Aragon initially had even broader leeway in its political sovereignty. This fact was driven home by the celebrated formula with which the Aragonese Court pledged loyalty to the monarch: the Aragonese branches or institutions stated that that “we are worth as much as you are, and together more than you”, before recognising the monarch as “our king and lord”. However, the Aragonese foral regime was substantially amended by the Court of 1592, called by Philip II after his troops had put down the revolt of the kingdom. Likewise, despite the fact that the Kingdom of Valencia had a foral political system rooted in pactism, the monarch’s competences there were always quite extensive. Even clearer is the case of the Kingdom of Majorca, the only kingdom that did not have its own general Court. The monarch’s more sweeping influence in Valencia and Majorca had a clear cause: unlike Aragon and Catalonia, which were constituent kingdoms of the Crown of Aragon, Valencia and Majorca were consecutive and therefore conquered kingdoms. This determined their legal status, as it did in the Kingdom of Sardinia, the other state linked to the Crown of Aragon in the modern age.

However, the leeway of the representative institutions in Catalonia was substantially curtailed after the Catalan Revolt or Reapers’ War (1640-1659). With the Spanish troops permanently occupying Barcelona (1652), Philip IV reserved several important competences for himself. Two in particular deserve mention: control of the lists of “insaculats” or people electable by lottery from the Generalitat and the Consell de Cent (Council of One Hundred, or municipal government), and military control of the city (walls, the fortress on Montjuïc, etc.). Only with an awareness of how the land was militarily and politically controlled is it possible to grasp the country’s institutions’ lack of response to the signing of the Treaty of the Pyrenees between Philip IV and Louis XIV (1659). As is well-known, this treaty meant the division of Catalonia and the annexation of its northern part (the counties of Roussillon and the French Cerdagne) to the Kingdom of France.

**INTERNATIONAL WAR AND INTERNAL REVOLT**

During the Reign of Charles II (1665-1700), France deployed an extremely active military and diplomatic policy aimed at influencing the succession in the Spanish king-
Thus, the first few steps of the exceedingly young Philip of Anjou’s reign as Philip V of Spain inspired respect but not enthusiasm. This was homogeneous, widespread conduct in all the kingdoms, and in Catalonia as well, where as is known the new king called the General Court (1701), swore his oath to the constitutions and granted major economic and political concessions.7

A reflection on the period from 1700 to 1705 is particularly interesting. Those years witnessed a leap from more or less widespread yet disorganised and demobilised anti-French sentiment to the formation of a true Austriacist party which advocated the downfall of the monarch and his replacement with Archduke Charles of Austria, whose Spanish followers called him Charles III. This leap, it should be recalled, took place under the most clandestine circumstances.

The Austriacist literature, both from the early days and the body produced in exile after defeat, stresses the internal causes of this change in attitude. Castilian Austriacism, little known even today, underscored the fact that the change in dynasty represented the submission of what used to be a major power to France. Therefore, the enthronement of Philip V would signal the nadir of Spanish decline. The argument also had an economic facet, as the Spanish pro-Austrian propaganda recalled French companies’ monopolistic dominance in the Spanish-American trade, especially in the slave trade, after the enthronement of Philip V. The reduction of the old monarchy to its own discourse continuously throughout the entire war, also stressed the internal causes of the rupture. This discourse was particularly developed by Narcís Feliu de la Penya, an early Austriacist who was imprisoned by the Bourbon police in 1704. In 1709, he published the Anales de Cataluña (Annals of Catalonia), which can be regarded as the official history of Catalonia under the Archduke. The author devotes much of the third volume to describing the process of how relations between the Catalans and Philip V deteriorated. In fact, the chapters in this work explain how the events after the death of Charles II met with the ire of the Bourbon authorities in 1714, who then ordered the mass destruction.5

However Feliu, and with him Catalan Austriacism, developed their own line of argumentation. The goal was to describe the litany of complaints, abuses, unconstitutional deeds and similar grievances that had characterised the behaviour of Philip V and his ministers during the year prior to the 1705 uprising. More or less implicitly, the litany of disloyal acts committed by the monarch would have invalidated the oath of loyalty that Catalonia had sworn to the General Court in 1701 and thus legitimised the rupture. This argument, incidentally, invalidated the accusations of rebellion that the Bourbon propaganda incessantly repeated.

A careful reading of the text by Feliu, not only a firsthand witness of the events but also an active participant in them, shows, at least until 1704, a kind of sporadic conflict not unlike the ones that the institutions “of the land” and the royal viceroys had experienced in the previous reigns.6 It is true that from the start there were reasons for tension between the Crown and the representative institutions, and most notably with the Council of One Hundred and the military (a corporation made up of the nobility and citizens headquartered in Barcelona). However, it is also true that the dynamics of both sides took place in the shadow of a dynastic dispute that had not yet taken on an explicit form.

We must examine the extremely meagre clandestine political texts from that early period in order to ascertain that the dynamic that led the Catalan-speaking lands – and all the Spanish kingdoms – to war took place in an international context.9 Here, however, there is another source that is particularly revealing, namely Francesc de Castellví’s Narraciones históricas (Historical Narrations). The author, a knight born in Montblanc (Conca de Barberà), one of the areas where Bourbon repression was extreme, was one of the earliest Austriacists; he participated in Barcelona’s last resistance and lived in a semi-covert fashion in the first post-war period. In 1726, one year after the Peace of Vienna, which would lead to reciprocal amnesty for the followers of both Philip V and Charles III (then Charles VI, Holy Roman Emperor), Castellví sought exile in the capital of the empire. There he spent the rest of his life – over 30 years until his death in 1757 – writing his monumental history of the war.10

Castellví wrote from exile and defeat, without either the urgency or the dissimulations of one who feels like an active stakeholder in the conflict. Furthermore, he did so with an unequivocal desire for objectivity and with outstanding intellectual honesty, which makes his work exceptionally relevant. From this vantage point, without mincing his words Castellví describes the steps in the construction and spread of the Austriacist party, particularly in Catalonia, as well as its link to the allied states from the very outset. What is more, the author from Montblanc allows himself to mention Feliu’s Annals on several occasions, separating out what he reveals from what he conceals. This exercise in intellectual honesty goes so far as to shed light on certain attitudes present in the initial Bourbon repression, which reflected the growing dimensions of the Austriacist threat.

The allied powers’ key role in shaping the Austriacist rise is also a crucial factor in two important political texts published in 1734-1736 in the context of a new interna-
tional conflict (the War of the Polish Succession), which seemed to breathe new life into the claims for a fair solution for the “case of the Catalans”. These works are *Via fora als adormits* (roughly, A Call to Action for the People), a lengthy political leaflet that was published in two versions, Catalan and French; and *Record de l’Aliança fet al serenissim Jordi, Auguste rei de la Gran Bretaña* (Remembrance of the Alliance made with the Most Serene Highness George, August King of Great Britain), which was printed in a bilingual Catalan and Latin edition. The main gist of both texts was to blame the allied states, especially England, for the Catalan uprising and to demand that they satisfy the debt incurred with Catalonia as part of the foreseeable new peace treaties.¹¹

In short, the external explanation of the War of the Spanish Succession as a civil war underscores the origins and international dimension of the conflict at the outset. It is a fairly well-known historical sequence, although not always sufficiently valued by romantic Catalan and Spanish historiographies: the formation of the Great Alliance of The Hague (1701); the declaration of war in the Bourbon states of Spain and France (1702); the proclamation of Archduke Charles as King of Spain under the name of Charles III in Vienna (1703); the Alliance’s entry into Savoy and Portugal that same year; and Charles III’s arrival in Lisbon and the onset of the peninsular hostilities (1704). Every single one of these events was accompanied by allied victories and non-defeats on the continent’s battlefields, and they triggered the fairly widespread impression that the Austriacist cause was ultimately destined to prevail. It was in this climate of expectation, and ultimately of euphoria, that the Austriacist party gestated and grew.

The international dimension in the first rumblings of civil war is driven home by the most probable etymological origin of the word *botifler*, a highly derogatory term used in all the Catalan-speaking lands quite early on (it is documented as far back as 1702), which Charles’ followers used to call Bourbon supporters. According to Castellvi, yet also according to the Valencian *botiflers* Isidre Planes and Josep Vicent Ortí i Major,¹² the word is a parodial or comical twist on the surname of Marshal Boufflers, who led the French army in several battles in 1702 and 1703. Since its outcome was uncertain, whoever spread news favourable to the Bourbons was called a *botifler*, just as those who did the same in favour of the allies were known as imperials. As is known, that word loomed over Philip V’s followers during the war and throughout the lengthy post-war period. In fact, it is still a pejorative concept often used in Catalan political jargon today to refer to Catalans propounding submission to Spanish centralism.

If we recapitulate the above, we will realise that the Catalan-speaking lands’ involvement in the War of the Spanish Succession had deep-seated internal causes, yet it would have also been impossible without the outbreak of international war. The Catalans could not look favourably upon a dynasty that had consolidated its power on the basis of political uniformism and absolutism, even less so when they had just witnessed, recently in historical terms, the northern Catalan-speaking counties’ process of violent assimilation, as well as the disasters of the recent military occupations in the Principality, as Southern Catalonia was called. In this context, the sympathies of the Catalan ruling core inevitably had to seek other horizons: either the composite monarchy of the German Hapsburgs, who guaranteed, in acceptable enough terms for the day and age, respect for the diverse historical and identity realities; or the parliamentary and economically open models of England and the United Provinces of the Netherlands.

However, the war would not have broken out in Catalonia without the existence of its first international episodes, or without the conviction among a large swath of the ruling class that victory was possible.

From this twofold perspective, then, the case of the Catalans was perfectly comparable to that of other nations or collectives who had historical grievances with the state structure under which they fell or to which they were subjugated. They include the Scottish Jacobites, who were against the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the 1707 Act of Union but were ultimately aided by France; the Hungarian malcontents opposed to the rising Germanisation of the land, yet also financed from Paris; and the French Protestant *camisards*, reduced to Catholic uniformism with the revocation of the Edict of Nantes decreed by Louis XIV, yet who nonetheless enjoyed the political and fiscal support and supervision of the English Whigs.¹³

In any event, Austriacism grew as a clandestine political option in all the Spanish kingdoms thanks to the twofold stimulus of internal structural conflicts and external pressure. In Castile, it quite likely managed to encompass much broader middle-class and aristocratic swaths of society than those who ended up supporting it explicitly. In Valencia, it spread among the peasants, who had recently been defeated in the uprising known as the Segona Germandia (Second Brotherhood); yet it also received much more obvious support among the bourgeoisie of Valencia and other cities in the kingdom than what had been thought up to a few decades ago.¹⁴ In some cities, such as Alcoy, the war paralleled local feuds between families who were vying for hegemony.¹⁵ The commercial interests of an Anglophile bourgeoisie also explain the choice in favour of the allies by Cartagena, in the Kingdom of Murcia, the area that was the most explicitly favourable to the allies within the Crown of Castile.

Also at this point we are more familiar with the circumstances in the Principality. In Catalonia, the Austraciast party grew and even achieved clear social hegemony over a threefold foundation.¹⁶ First, Austriacism rose in strength among the military leaders who organised the popular resistance to the French invasions along the Vic-Ripoll axis in the second half of the 17th century.
They included petty nobles and landowners who became the leaders of their local communities and led the irregular corps of riflemen, musketeers and militiamen. In fact, they were the *vigatans*, a blanket term to describe the entire anti-Bourbon resistance in Catalonia. This group maintained close ties to the German Prince George of Hessen-Darmstadt, the hero of the Catalan resistance against the French troops during the Nine Years’ War and the last viceroy of Charles II who was later sent into exile by Philip V; he played a crucial role in the formation of the Great Alliance of The Hague. The *vigatans* were, in fact, the armed wing of the Austriacist party in Catalonia.

However, the hardcore of Catalan Austriacism was made up of Barcelona’s commercial bourgeoisie. In the sphere of what Narcís Felu de la Penya defined using the metaphor of the *Fénix de Cataluña* (Phoenix of Catalonia),

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And the Coronela, or urban militia, played a key role in the defence of the city. The allied troops were forced to leave post-haste. However, it should be noted that several hundred members of the conspiracy took advantage of that juncture to leave Barcelona and embark on the fleet that would conquer Gibraltar weeks later. This first group of Catalan exiles travelled to Lisbon, yet smaller numbers of them also went to Gibraltar, Genoa (a neutral republic and by definition a den of spies from both sides) and even Vienna. The presence of a significant number of exiles expanded the resistance’s international contacts, as well as the network through which allied correspondence could arrive.

In any event, the failed disembarkation and the conviction that there was an internal conspiracy triggered heavy repression in both Barcelona and Catalonia as a whole. On this point, it is interesting to contrast the sources from Catalonia and from the Court. To wit, according to Narcís Felu de la Penya, it is clear that the repression spearheaded by the viceroy Duke of Velasco was unprecedented in both its scope and the means it used. To the contrary, the Madrid sources tended to accuse Velasco of being too soft and incapable of handling the uprising.

In reality, both perceptions are based on one true point. In a complementary fashion, they indicate the qualitative leap in the clash between Catalonia and Philip V. This leap was characterised by the shift from traditional, sporadic and more or less corporate conflicts to new and more widely subversive behaviours, and especially by the massive use of certain public expressions of contempt for the order in power, such as the use of yellow bows, which became an emblem of Austriacism. The tide in favour of Charles III gradually came to conquer realms of expression and interaction, and in parallel, the so-called *botiflers* began to experience the strange sensation of being in the minority.

However not even under those circumstances did the most brazen Austriacists believe that any kind of popular revolt to oust the Bourbon would be possible. Quite the contrary, Austriacism, which was largely a by-product of

**From the failed disembarkation to the successful disembarkation (1704-1705)**

Along with the social and ideological characterisation of Austriacism, we should also bear in mind its generational composition. Generally speaking, until at least 1704, those committed to the anti-Bourbon opposition were young adults who lacked a significant presence in the country’s governing institutions. This became crystal clear with the allied disembarkation in Barcelona on the 28th of May of the same year.

It is quite clear that this enterprise had the support of a conspiracy inside the city. Yet it is also evident that when the time came, it was a feeble and immature undertaking. The institutions “of the land”, namely the Generalitat and the Council of One Hundred, were placed at the service of the Duke of Velasco, the viceroy of Catalonia for Philip V. And the Coronela, or urban militia, played a key role in the defence of the city. The allied troops were forced to leave post-haste. However, it should be noted that several hundred members of the conspiracy took advantage of that juncture to leave Barcelona and embark on the fleet that would conquer Gibraltar weeks later. This first group of Catalan exiles travelled to Lisbon, yet smaller numbers of them also went to Gibraltar, Genoa (a neutral republic and by definition a den of spies from both sides) and even Vienna. The presence of a significant number of exiles expanded the resistance’s international contacts, as well as the network through which allied correspondence could arrive.

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the international war as we have seen, needed the allies more than ever.

And by the end of 1704, this need was now mutual. The Great Alliance had been sustaining a war against the two Bourbon crowns for two long years in the name of a dynastic dispute that had not given rise to major armed ex-

pressions in the country where, in theory, the grievance was supposed to be resolved. The activation of the Portuguese front with Charles III’s arrival in Lisbon had ended in utter failure. And the allies’ indisputable naval hegemony on the Iberian coasts had only secured Gibraltar, which became like a presidium with its back turned on

Figure 2. Map of the War of the Spanish Succession, 1702–1706 (from Catalunya i la Guerra de Successió. Museu d’Història de Catalunya, Barcelona 2007).
the hinterland. The allied failure in Spanish lands con-trasted with the victorious dynamic of its troops on all other fronts.

All of these factors together can explain the overlap between the internal resistance and the allied states, the utmost expression of which was the signing of the Pact of Genoa on the 20th of June 1705. This pact, which committed England and the Catalan vigatans, expressed both sides’ long-term desire to reach an agreement. First, the ambassadors who signed on behalf of the internal resistance shared their condition as exiles since 1704. Barcelona native Antoni de Peguera, then only 23 years old, had been one of the founders of the Acadèmia dels Desconfiats. Domènec Perera, a lawyer, was a highly esteemed figure on the Vic plain. In turn, Queen Anne’s plenipotentiary ambassador was Mitford Crowe, a merchant who had done business in Catalonia, manufacturing and exporting liquor. Thus, he fulfilled a twofold condition: he was familiar with the country and was well-known by much of the ruling class.

As if all this were not enough to inspire trust inside Catalonia, the pact guaranteed allied military support for a possible uprising. And, perhaps even more importantly for winning over Catalan public opinion, it guaranteed
England’s commitment to uphold Catalonia’s constitutions, regardless of the outcome of the dispute.

The crucial importance of the pact was confirmed by immediate events. On the 20th of June, the vigatans won the Congost from the Bourbon troops and wrested control of the county of Osona along the course of the Besós River, one of the main supply routes to Barcelona. One month later, on the 22nd of August, a large allied fleet disembarked before the city. One of its passengers was Archduke Charles of Austria, Charles III. Throughout the month and a half long siege, the resistance played a key role both at the gateways of Barcelona and in spreading the uprising around the country. However, at this point we cannot accept Narcís Feliu de la Penya’s account word for word, as it has an undeniable agitating tone, as proven by Josep M. Torras.

The allied success in Barcelona was accompanied by the triumph of the “maulets”, or Valencian Austracists, in an operation that was most likely only designed as a military distraction: on the 10th of August, just a few days before the disembarkation in Barcelona, the allied fleet had disembarked a small contingent fleet of men off the coast of Altea, in the southern portion of the Kingdom of Valencia. It was commanded by the imperial officer Joan Baptista Basset i Ramos. Originally hailing from Valencia, Basset had forged his military career in the imperial army, where he stood out as an artilleryman, and he had accompanied the Prince of Hessen-Darmstadt in the negotiating process that led to the signing of the treaty of the Great Alliance. Endowed with a heavily populist character, Basset won the support of the town of Dénia and afterwards a large number of Valencian peasants, whom he promised release from their feudal servitude.

With an essentially improvised army of the people, Basset won the backing of the Catalan troops under General Rafael Nebot, who had initially been charged with putting him down. However, his swift entry into the city of Valencia on the 16th of December also confirmed the scope of the conspiratorial circles inside the city. Just like in Barcelona, much of the Valencian bourgeoisie had already taken sides with the Archduke’s cause, including such major figures as Josep Vicent Torres Eiximeno, the secretary of the Municipal Council.

It is more difficult to ascertain the extent of the conspiracy within the nobility and the ecclesiastical hierarchy. The Count of Cardona, Josep Folch de Cardona i Erill, stood out for his defence of Charles III from the very start. However, his was a rather exceptional case. Cardona belonged to a side branch of the family line, and his ascent was inextricably linked to the Court of the Habsburgs, first in Madrid and later in Vienna. The stance in favour of Philip V was more frequent at first, although much of the Valencian nobility ended up shifting to back the Archduke’s cause during the second allied offensive on Madrid in 1710, including such prominent figures as Joan Basili de Castellvi i Coloma, the Count of Cervelló, and the Archbishop of Valencia, Antoni Folch de Cardona.

The change in sympathies might be put down to a twofold impetus from abroad. First, it is clear that in 1705 Basset’s anti-feudal discourse somewhat alienated some of the nobility that might initially have been leaning towards Charles III’s cause. Secondly, the abolition of the Furs de València (the laws of the Kingdom of Valencia) and the imposition of the laws of Castile in the kingdom in 1707, along with the extremely harsh repression exercised by the Bourbon troops, ended up conducting these sectors towards the Austriacist cause.

The remaining territories in the Crown of Aragon, including the Kingdom of Aragon and the islands of Majorca, Ibiza and Sardinia, gradually proclaimed their support for the Archduke as the allied armies announced their presence. Therefore, we should understand that in all these realms the Austriacist cause earned widespread sympathy, but in none of them was it powerful enough to devolve into subversion. The only exception to this dynamic was Minorca. However, the unilateral proclamation of Charles as king in 1706 was put down by the January 1707 Bourbon occupation, which shortly thereafter abolished the island’s privileges. Minorca was won back by allied troops in late September 1708.

The active or passive Austriacism of the kingdoms in the Crown of Aragon contrasts with the clearly predominant support for Philip among the people of Castile. This stance became particularly clear during the two allied occupations of Madrid in 1706 and 1710. Although on both occasions the Bourbon authorities imprisoned aristocrats and bishops who had been accused of collaborating with Charles III, the Austracists’ capacity for mobilisation was quite flimsy and Philip V’s cause even won support as a result of these deeds. This reality unquestionably contrasts with Castilian Austriacism’s early and major presence in powerful nuclei until then.

The key to this paradox may be found once again in the arguments used by the propagandists. As M. Teresa Pérez Picazo has pointed out, the Castilian Bourbon texts heightened their xenophobic discourse at these junctures, painting the allied army as a conglomerate made up of Protestants and enemies of Spain. In this overall context, Catalanophobia took on particular pride of place, especially in the texts addressed to the common people.

In fact, this discourse was anything but new. It was even predicted by the Admiral of Castile in Lisbon when talk began of a probable allied disembarkation in Barcelona. The chroniclers on both sides dovetail on this point. The Sardinian pro-Philip historian Vícenç Bacallar, Marquis of San Felipe, puts the following words into the Admiral’s mouth: "el golpe mortal para la España era atacar la Andalucía, porque nunca obedecería Castilla a rey que entrase por Aragón, porque ésta era la cabeza de la Monarquía". And Francesc de Castellví himself confirmed the sense of the Admiral’s statement: "Que, dirigiéndose las armas a Cataluña, esto haría más pertinaces las Castillas, que juzgarían presumía la Corona de Aragón darles ley; [...] que si el rey entraba por Andalucía a ocupar Madrid se
Charles III, King of the Catalans: Politics and war

The international war also became a civil war on the 7th of November 1705, the date of Charles III’s triumphal entry into Barcelona. Two young foreign princes set up their parallel courts in Madrid and Barcelona, with a government structure made up of councils and secretaries that tended to be carbon copies of each other.28

Just like his ancestor and rival, Charles called the General Court of Catalonia and proved himself particularly generous with it. Not only did he repeat some of the main economic concessions (direct trade with America, the duty-free port of Barcelona) and political concessions (such as the creation of the Constitutional Tribunal) granted by the first Spanish Bourbon, he also added new ones, including the abolition of royal control over the ballot voting of the Generalitat and the Council of One Hundred, which de facto erased the last major repressive consequence of the 1640 revolution. Along the same lines, worth highlighting is the legalisation of the Conferència dels Tres Comuns (Conference of the Three Commons), which encompassed these two institutions and the military wing. This association of institutions had been explicitly banned by Philip V, and it would come to play a pivotal role in the last defence of Barcelona during the siege of 1713–1714.

All of this was joined by a deliberate policy of promoting local Austriacism in society through ennoblements, concessions to honourable citizens, titles and civilian and military appointments. Therefore, we could say that in the spring of 1706, once Barcelona overcame the first Bourbon siege, the Austriacist party consolidated its victory in the spheres of the military, ideas and individuals.

However, the day-to-day operation of the new regime was anything but smooth. The tensions between the Crown and the institutions “of the land” reappeared quickly and became especially palpable starting in late 1707, when the war definitively reached Catalonia with the Bourbon occupation of Lleida. In that context, the Court managed to generate projects with an authoritarian or absolutist bent. In any event, it is impossible to draw conclusions about how Charles’ court would have evolved had the conflict ended differently. In this sense, we should bear in mind that the government of Barcelona was permanently affected by the war, which conferred on it an ongoing exceptional status.

This status of exceptionalness was experienced on a twofold level. First, Barcelona not only remained the capital of the Principality, rather it also suddenly became the capital of a parallel court, where the entire architecture of the councils characteristic of the Spanish Habsburgs was set up in a more or less improvised or imperfect way. Su-
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However, Charles III lost the war not on the Iberian front but in international diplomacy. As is well known, on the 11th of April 1713 the Treaty of Utrecht was signed, putting an end to the international war. Almost one month earlier, on the 19th of March, his wife Elizabeth Christina had set sail from Barcelona to the empire in the company of some of the most conspicuous members of the court. Article 13 of the treaty recognised the efforts of Queen Anne of England to guarantee that the constitutions of Catalonia were upheld (although it did not explicitly mention the Pact of Genoa signed with the Catalans in 1705). However, the Queen was satisfied with Philip V’s pledge to guarantee the Catalans the “privileges held by the inhabitants of both Castiles, who of all the peoples of Spain are the ones that love the Catholic King the best”. It goes without saying that this text endorsed, albeit with an undeniable measure of cynicism, the desire of the first Spanish Bourbon to abolish the constitutions of Catalonia.31

The withdrawal of allied troops was accompanied by the parallel advance of the army of the two crowns. This practice, agreed upon by the top military authorities in the Convention of Hospitallet (22nd of June), had only three exceptions: the garrisons at the forts of Castellciutat and Cardona, governed respectively by Generals Josep Moragues and Manuel Desvalls, and especially Barcelona. In the capital of Catalonia, the chief councillor was in charge, on behalf of the city, of the fortress on Montjuïc and the Drassanes shipyards, where the allied army’s munitions and war materiel were kept. This latter act, which was clearly groundbreaking, would mark the subsequent events.32

Indeed, while General Starhemberg, the last viceroy of Catalonia, completed the withdrawal of the imperial troops, the General Deputation called the Junta General de Braços de Catalunya, in agreement with the two other commons. This institution, which was also known then as the Parliament of Catalonia, had even greater social and territorial representation than the General Court, from which it differed by the absence of the monarch. In fact, the Junta General had only been called on one other occasion, in 1641, a juncture also characterised by rupture and war.

The Junta was officially constituted on the 30th of June 1713, and it was organised into separate meetings of the wings or branches. The debate was extremely heated in the military and royal branches, as the ecclesiastic branch chose not to take part in the voting. The terms that were discussed were surrender or resistance. To support the former, such obvious arguments were wielded as the inevitability of defeat and the need to avoid bloodshed and the ruin of the country. The second option appealed to the pride and history of the fatherland, to the irreversibility of the loss of the constitutions and even to the possibility that the international situation might change in the forthcoming months. Based on this argumentation, resistance became a tactic dictated by political prudence, at least in the early stages. Thanks to Francesc de Castellvi, we still have the speeches delivered in the military branch, all of them rhetorically effective and boasting undeniable political eloquence.33

Everything leads us to believe that the majority of those attending the Junta de Braços advocated surrender. A preliminary text along these lines was drawn up on behalf of the equitable representation of all three branches. However, on the 9th of July the General Deputation publicised the Junta’s agreement to resist. This came as a great surprise not only to the European chancelleries, beginning with the imperial chancellery, but also to a broad swath of Catalan public opinion. It was the outcome of a variety of factors: the ecclesiastic branch’s decision not to take part in the voting, probably convinced of its outcome in favour of surrender; the steadfast preference for resistance in the royal branch, made up of cities, towns and free places; and the presence of a highly vociferous, albeit probably minority, core of members of the military branch also leaning towards resistance, which forced a second vote after the cities and villages had chosen this option. We should also add the pressure from Barcelona’s lower echelons, which repeatedly, and even violently, threatened the sectors in favour of surrender, and which probably managed to ensure some nobles in favour of this option were absent from the city before the second and decisive vote in their branch. Conversely, also worth noting is Starhemberg’s pressure on the wealthy sectors of society to accept what had been agreed to in Utrecht.

The army of the two crowns, commanded by the Duke of Pòpuli, encircled the city and ordered it to surrender on the 25th of July 1713. The forces were clearly ill-matched. At the peak of the siege, the Bourbon troops managed to gather 100,000 men in Catalonia, half of whom were stationed around the city. In contrast, the defensive forces were paltry: around 2,000 professional soldiers led by General Antoni de Villarroel in Barcelona. There might have been slightly more mountain riflemen scattered around the country, which were joined by the garrisons in Castellciutat and Cardona, and around 5,000 civilians, locals and refugees which made up Barcelona’s Coronela or urban militia, led by its chief councillor (Rafael Casanova, starting in November 1713).

However, the city successfully resisted the first few months of the siege, even though it did not manage to spread this resistance to the land as a whole. The winter of 1714, however, witnessed the spread of the revolt of the Quinzenades, named after the new tax introduced by the Bourbon authorities at the time.34 The repression of this movement was fierce, and it ended with a vast number of burned, devastated towns and massive, indiscriminate killings. Starting on the 22nd of May 1714, the Bourbon battery achieved positions that enabled them to launch the bombardments of Barcelona. The siege picked up momentum on the 6th of July, almost one year after it start-
Figure 4 a,b,c. The Siege of Barcelona, 1714. Engravings by Jacint Rigaud (Historic Archive of the City of Barcelona)
ed, as the Duke of Berwick and numerous French troops joined it. And as the history books all state, Barcelona fell on the 11th of September.

It is not our objective here to provide a detailed list of the military events that took place throughout those 14 months, nor to examine their terrible influence on the civilian population, which is amply discussed by Francesc de Castellví. However, we would like to offer several reflections on the governance of the resistance during that period, a subject that we have analysed more extensively.36

The government of a kingless country inevitably took on a republican form. It was structured by means of collegial organisations with a certain degree of organisational complexity yet, as we have seen, which already had a longstanding tradition and numerous complicities. Thus, when the Junta General de Braços suspended its functions on the 16th of July 1713, it appointed a collegial board consisting of 36 members, 12 per branch, charged with leading the resistance on behalf of the official bodies. Worth pointing out is the executive, not merely consultative, nature of this board. Thus, even though the deputies of the General Deputation continued to have a protocol-based presence within the institutions, the real power was harnessed through this extensive board.

Likewise, the Conference of the Three Commons, made up of the Deputation, the Council of One Hundred and the military wing, took charge of effectively governing the resistance. One of its first measures was to notify the viceroy of Majorca, Joan Antoni de Rubí i de Boixadors, Marquis of Rubí, of the decision to put up resistance. It also notified the Catalan ambassadors in the old allied courts who had been appointed by the Commons in the preceding months. Throughout the siege, the ambassadors received instructions to seek a negotiated solution to the conflict; the speculations included the possibility of forming a “free republic” made up of Catalonia, Majorca and Ibiza under a British protectorate.

On the 26th of February 1714, the 36-member board was replaced by a 24-member board made up exclusively of members of the Council of One Hundred. As had already happened in the Reapers’ War, the enemy troops’ occupation of almost the entire country had left the General Deputation without revenue and with scant political representativeness. Just like then, the Council of One Hundred seized leadership of the last resistance. Yet it is worth pointing out that the Conference of the Three Commons continued to make all the important political decisions in a collegial fashion.

However, the government formed in July 1713 showed a special interest in maintaining the legality of a political system which had been surmounted by a monarch, Charles III, on whose behalf the resistance had been proclaimed. In the absence of a viceroy in the wake of Starhemberg’s evacuation, the top representative of the monarch in the Principality was the spokesman for the general govern-ance, Pere de Sentmenat-Torrelles, who stood in for the viceroy by performing his functions. The same can be said of the Audiencia or Tribunal of Catalonia, which was largely decimated due to the departure of some of its members to Mataró, a town under Bourbon control.

From Vienna, Charles played his hand, too. A key figure in this was the notary Joan Francesc de Verneda, the brother-in-law of Ramon de Vilana-Perles, who by then had been appointed the Secretary of State and Secretary of the Universal Office of the Council of Spain, with its headquarters in the capital of the empire. Verneda, who had left Catalonia in the entourage accompanying the empress Elisabeth Cristina in March 1713, returned to Barcelona on the 2nd of October of that same year. Thereafter, he played the role of agent or official ambassador of the emperor-king in Barcelona. Through the viceroy of Majorca, Verneda kept the Council of Spain, and especially his brother-in-law Vilana-Perles, abreast of the course of events in Barcelona, and he received specific orders of action from them.

The military rule of Barcelona was entrusted to a restricted commission, called the Junta Secreta (Secret Board), which was made up of representatives of the Three Commons, the government spokesmen and Verneda himself. The board met with the general governor, Antoni de Villarroel, who, at least since Verneda’s arrival, felt appointed by his king, Charles III.

Throughout the siege, the resistance organised sweeping political propaganda. The most significant discourse along these lines was the Despertador de Catalunya (which can be roughly translated as Catalonia’s Wake-up Call). This text, published in Barcelona in November 1713, was translated into Italian shortly thereafter and printed in Naples. Unlike the propaganda from 1705 to 1706, which was more clearly dynastic in tone, the texts from the last siege of Barcelona stress republican values like the freedom of the homeland and the supremacy of the common good and the general interest. Likewise, it refuted the Bourbon propaganda, which painted the constitutions of Catalonia as a set of archaic rights aimed exclusively at the privileged sectors. In contrast to this vision, texts like the Despertador highlighted the vast number of rights – fiscal, juridical and many other kinds – that common Catalans enjoyed thanks to the legal system, which was in danger of extinction at that time.37

Also worth highlighting is the publication of the Gase-
ta de Barcelona (Gazette of Barcelona) in the city, which released 42 issues between July 1713 and August 1714.38 The purpose of this publication was to boost the morale of the besieged citizens and to counter the Bourbon propaganda.

The defence of the country soon took on guises of popular Catholic fervour as well, which gradually slipped towards millenarianism throughout the months of the siege. The daily expressions of mass religiosity were spearheaded by members of the ordinary urban clergy, who some prominent leaders of the resistance derogatorily referred to as “holy men”. Some forms of popular devotion were halfway between civil and Catholic discours-
es. The worship of Our Lady of Freedom was particularly popular and gave rise to several highly celebrated verses.

**The repression and the Nueva Planta decrees**

In Catalonia, the rout of 1715 only bears comparison with that of 1939. Everything points to the fact that the figures on retaliation, executions and exiles are somewhat interchangeable in proportion to the population in both years. Furthermore, in both cases, the qualitative consequences of the repression were even more pronounced, as it particularly affected the sectors which, from a diverse social reality and throughout the entire land, had led a project for the country and for the future. Beyond the decapitation of the leading class, the defeat on both dates also led to the end of Catalonia’s own legal-political organisation and the imposition of the model of state against which it had fought.

The regime that was set up in Catalonia in the months after the 11th of September has been described as military terrorism by several authors, starting with Salvador Sanpere i Miquel. In fact this model, characterised by indiscriminate action and the utter impunity of army officials, had two immediate precedents. The first, as we mentioned above, was in Valencia, especially after the Battle of Almansa, and it led to the burning of numerous villages. The second took place in the Principality during the first few months of 1714, triggered by the revolt against the Quinzenades taxes. In both cases, the army resorted to similar practices: indiscriminate collective punishment, mass executions of the resistance, military coercion, requisitions, the imprisonment of local authorities and surcharges on neighbouring towns in the event of unpaid taxes, in short, the abusive, ongoing practice of the pedagogy of state terror.

However, the spread of military terrorism over the entire land was in no way the outcome of spontaneous or autonomous actions on the part of the army leaders. Quite the contrary, it was part of a meticulous plan which singled out and punished its victims at all times. Thus, the military and political leaders of Barcelona’s resistance during the 1713-1714 siege were arrested and sent to Alicante, where they were distributed among the presidiums in Hondarribia, Pamplona and La Coruña. The majority were not released until 1725. Likewise, the officers and soldiers were either imprisoned closer to home, such as in Tortosa or Peníscola, or allowed to return to their towns and homes under the condition that they had to report to the Bourbon authorities periodically.

Furthermore, several dozen churchmen were removed to lands under the jurisdiction of the emperor, especially in Italy or the Pontifical States. The same fate befell hundreds of refugees from other Spanish kingdoms who had remained in Catalonia during the siege. This measure was even applied to those who took refuge in Mataró, which was under Bourbon domination, awaiting Philip V’s pardon.

The policy of repression encompassed all spheres. The assets of the Austrians were seized by the royal administration. All the titles, posts and honours granted during the reign of Charles III were rescinded. This policy of erasing the historical memory become a primary objective which entailed the destruction of the symbols of both the distant and recent past, the total or partial prohibition of works published during the time of Charles III and rigid censorship of the chronicles from his day, which even prevented texts clearly in support of Philip V and hostile to his rivals from being disseminated in the Spanish monarchy.

The decrees banning weapons were applied across the board. In the majority of cities and towns in Catalonia, the army came to permanently occupy the most emblematic and largest buildings. In Lleida, for example, it took over the Seu Vella, or old cathedral. In Barcelona, in addition to occupying Montjuïc, the city walls, the Drassanes shipyards, former convents like Sant Agustí and public buildings like the university on La Rambla dels Estudis, it also ordered the military Ciutadella (citadel) built, a work that, as Albert Garcia Espuche has pointed out, required more than 1,200 homes to be destroyed, that is, one-fifth of the homes in the entire city.

All the universities were shuttered. In their place, a single university was created in Cervera, a town with Bourbon leanings, which was placed under the supervision of the Company of Jesus. The Catalan language was gradually proscribed in all public realms, following the guideline expressed in an instruction to the magistrates in 1717: "may the effect be achieved without citizens noticing it".

The Nueva Planta decree of Catalonia, dated the 16th of January 1716, was the last link in a chain of decrees that affected all the kingdoms within the Crown of Aragon. As discussed above, the first decree abolishing the furs (fueros in Spanish) or laws was published in 1707, targeted at the kingdoms of Valencia and Aragon. In 1711, a new decree was issued for this latter kingdom, the former having been rescinded during the allied offensive of 1710. The penultimate decree was published in the Kingdom of Majorca in 1715.

As Joan Mercader i Riba has pointed out, the text applied to Catalonia was the most elaborate and mature. The decree abolished all the representative institutions, both local and national. In their place, it proclaimed the absolute power of the monarch, who exercised this power through three parallel hierarchical lines, organised from top to bottom. First, the Captain General became the prime authority in the Principality in the military and political sphere, although its main function over the century was to command the plethora of military forces stationed in Catalonia. Secondly, the Royal Tribunal, made up of two civilian tribunals and one criminal tribunal with a total of 16 judges, became the supreme tribunal and the political government of the Principality. The institution’s
confiscation of the House of the Deputies, or the Palace of the Generalitat, symbolises its rise to power. The Tribunal was the only institution where the Catalan botiflers had a strong showing. Even though it was formally subordinate to the Captain General, its natural president, it had greater institutional continuity and a great deal of political clout, as it controlled the network of magistrates and mayors who were in charge of public order in the local sphere. Finally, the Superintendency was charged with collecting the army’s and administration’s taxes and payments; it was organised throughout the territory by sub-delegations.

In a pyramidal system, all the political authorities in Catalonia, even the local ones, had to be directly appointed by the king or, in the case of lower-level authorities, by the Royal Tribunal.

The new political organisation was complemented by the new system of taxation. The Superintendency took care of all the ordinary taxes formerly paid to the monarchy as well as the taxes of the Generalitat and the Council of One Hundred. As mentioned above, it also kept the assets seized from the Austriacists. It further created new indirect taxes and generated a new direct tax, the land register tax, published on the 9th of December 1715 and enforced starting in the following year.

From the start, the contributions to the land registry tax, along with other ancillary taxes, hovered at around one million pesos per year, which multiplied the value of the services voted in the last two convocations of the General Court of Catalonia 7.3 times. Its enforcement in a country that was financially ruined by the impact of wars was particularly burdensome and turned it into a de facto punishment for war. On the other hand, despite the fact that it was apparently equitable, several miscalculations in conception out of haste, coupled with the violence with which it was enforced, contributed to aggravating its consequences. In many cases, it was only possible to enforce this tax by military confiscations and other repressive measures. In cases of default, surcharges on neighbouring towns were also common. For all of these reasons, the new tax won the popular epithet of “catastrophic”.

However, despite the spectacular rise in fiscal pressure, the military presence was so imposing throughout the century that the taxes paid by Catalonia did not even cover the state’s expenses. Thus, in 1729 the Crown’s total revenues in Catalonia only accounted for 58.49% of the expenses of the occupying army and 49.8% of the monarchy’s total expenses in the Principality.

In short, despite the fact that the Nueva Planta decrees were theoretically supposed to lead to the spread of Castilian laws and institutions in Catalonia – in line with the commitment Philip V made in Utrecht – in reality what it introduced was essentially new. Thus, the concentration of power in the hands of the Captain General, the militarisation of the post of magistrate, the very existence of the Superintendency and the tax model were a radically absolutist trial run which was only possible due to the condition of Catalonia as a vanquished land. When the monarch tried to introduce the land registry tax in the Crown of Castile starting in 1745, it was met with widespread opposition which required it to delay and ultimately table the project.

**Exile and “persistent Austriacism”**

One of the most important consequences of the War of the Spanish Succession was exile. The censuses drawn up after 1714 enable us to estimate the total number of exiles at between 25,000 and 30,000 people. The exiles included people from all social strata and all the peninsular kingdoms, although the Catalans were the most prominent group.

In fact, the exiles left in several different waves. The first was triggered by the July 1713 evacuation, when the majority of politicians and court nobles left Barcelona, as did a vast number of officers and soldiers with their families. Once in Italy, they set up three cavalry and two infantry regiments. The second major wave was a direct consequence of the 1714 defeat. The Cardona garrison left in an orderly fashion, as the capitulation of the fortress stipulated the occupants’ right to be able to leave the country. It was joined by the groups that had been banished by the Bourbon authorities, namely ecclesiasts and natives of other kingdoms living in Catalonia during the siege. However, the largest group to go into exile, and the one that lasted the longest, was covert: the thousands of Catalans who left the country in contravention of the law because their lives were endangered. This number was also enlarged by the Bourbon occupations of Majorca (1715) and Sardinia (1717) and the demobilisation of Carrasquet’s soldiers after the War of the Quadruple Alliance (1720). The Peace of Vienna (1725), which formally ended the war, stipulated reciprocal amnesty, whereupon the majority of officers who had been imprisoned since 1714 chose to go into exile.

The exiles mainly settled in the Kingdom of Naples and the state of Milan. However, the nobility and the upper echelon functionaries ended up in Vienna. There in the capital of the empire they formed the Councils of Spain and Flanders, charged with governing the lands granted to the emperor in the Treaty of Utrecht. The majority of their councillors were exiles. Likewise, as Ernest Lluch reminds us, German historiography stresses the influence in the imperial milieu exerted by the so-called “Spanish party”, also made up of exiles and former members of the Court of Barcelona. In turn, many of the exiled ecclesiasts gathered in Rome. Those who lived in the emperor’s lands were generally given pensions or incomes in accordance with their previous social status.

Until well into the 1740s, the exiles everywhere retained their identity traits and their own spheres of sociability. In Vienna, the exiles frequented the Benedictine monastery of Montserrat (the Schwatzspanier, or Black Spaniards) and the convent of the Barefooted Trinitarians
works were published in exile: La Crusca Provenzale (Provençal Tuscan, 1724) in Rome, a study that upheld the influence of the Catalan and Provençal troubadours in the roots of the Trecento; Josep Plantí, author of several historical works and a project to create a new city for the exiles; Juan Amor de Soria, who drew up several extremely important political texts; and jurists Domènec Aguirre and Francesc Solanes, among others.47

Major works of history and political thinking were written in exile. The most prominent figures include Francesc de Castellví, the author of the best Catalan chronicle of the war, which we have cited profusely; Antoni de Bastero, who published La Crusca Provenzale (Provençal Tuscan, 1724) in Rome, a study that upheld the influence of the Catalan and Provençal troubadours in the roots of the Trecento; Josep Plantí, author of several historical works and a project to create a new city for the exiles; Juan Amor de Soria, who drew up several extremely important political texts; and jurists Domènec Aguirre and Francesc Solanes, among others.47

Despite the ban on correspondence for lengthy periods of time, the exiles kept in political contact with the core of the resistance inside the country. The relationship was more intense during the large-scale international conflicts, which the exiles regarded as a platform for once again placing the “case of the Catalans” on the table. These circumstances arose during the War of the Quadruple Alliance (1718-1720) and the ensuing Congress of Cambrai, and on the occasion of the War of the Polish Succession (1733-1735). As mentioned above, during this latter conflict, which ended with the Bourbon occupation of Naples and Sicily, two extremely important political works were published in exile: Via fora als adormits and Record de l’Aliança fet al sereníssim Jordi, augment rei de la Gran Bretanya.48

By the end of the 1740s, the exiles were clearly beginning to disperse. This dispersion was compounded by the return to peninsular lands in some cases, and by deaths and dissolution into the host societies through mixed marriages in others.

In Catalonia, there were several groups which opposed the Bourbon occupation until the 1730s, obviously in a covert fashion. The guerrillas regained strength during the War of the Quadruple Alliance (1718-1720), which this time pitted the old allies and France against Philip V. In the summer of 1719, the guerrilla Pere Joan Barceló (“Carrasquet”), armed with French money and weapons, led a revolt in the southern counties of the Principality. Other leaders around Catalonia followed his example, as Enrique Giménez has pointed out.50 Likewise, in the Pyrenean villages occupied by the French troops, the regime prior to the Nueva Planta was reinstated. However, the end of the war, and especially the signing of the Peace of Vienna (1725), marked the consolidation of the Bourbon regime inside Catalonia. Even as late as 1735, there was a minor reprise of the guerrilla actions dovetailing with the new international war.

However, from that year on, Austriacism ceased to be a viable dynastic alternative. What remained, coined “persistent Austriacism” by Ernest Lluch,51 was merely nostalgia for the lost constitutions. This spirit permeated the different initiatives aimed at bringing back the institutions which were launched under the new legal system, such as the Memorial de Greuges (Record of Grievances) submitted to the Bourbon King Charles III in 1760 by representatives of the cities of Zaragoza, Valencia, Barcelona and Palma. The nostalgia for the former regime in the Nueva Planta was still present during the Peninsular War (1808-1814) and in the early stages of the Liberal Revolution.

Eighteenth century Catalonia experienced a climate of ongoing political occupation, as Lluís Roura has pointed out.52 However, the brutality with which the pedagogy of repression was exercised gradually combined with the development of mechanisms of integration or adaptation to the new regime. This process had gotten underway during the 1719 crisis and was even more evident among certain swaths of the leading classes and what we could call the “people of order”.53

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19 Albert GARCIA ESPUCHE. Barcelona..., op. cit.


[26] Vicenç Bacallar i Sanna. *Comentarios de la guerra de España e historia de su rey Felipe V*, el Anímoso, edited by Carlos Seco Serrano, Atlas, Madrid 1957, p. 94. The text reads: “The mortal blow for Spain was attacking Andalusia, because Castile would never obey a king that entered through Aragon, because that was the head of the monarchy”.

[27] Francesc de Castellví. *Narraciones...*, op. cit., vol. i, p. 510. The text reads: “That, leading the weapons to Catalonia, this would make the Castiles more obstinate, as they deemed that the Crown of Aragon was authorised to bestow law upon them; [...] that if the king entered through Andalusia to occupy Madrid he would remain in the kingdom, and that if he tried this through parts of Aragon and Valen cia he would not remain in Spain.”


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Biographical note

Agustí Alcoberro (1958) holds a doctorate in modern history, is a professor at the University of Barcelona and the director of the History Museum of Catalonia. He has published studies on humanism and the Renaissance, including the critical edition of the Cròniques d’Espanya (Chronicles of Spain) by Pere Miquel Carbonell (1997). He has recently specialised in the War of the Spanish Succession and the post-war period. He is the author of L’exili austriacista (1713-1747) (2002). He curated the exhibition “Catalunya i la Guerra de Successió” (Catalonia and the War of the Spanish Succession) at the History Museum of Catalonia (2007).